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THE JURY AS CRITIC: AN EMPIRICAL LOOK AT
HOW CAPITAL JURIES PERCEIVE EXPERT AND
LAY TESTIMONY
Scott E. Sundby*
When a psychologist or psychiatrist testifies during a defendant's com-
petency hearing, the psychologist or psychiatrist shall wear a cone-shaped
hat that is not less than two feet tall. The surface of the hat shall be im-
printed with stars and lightning bolts. Additionally, a psychologist or
psychiatrist shall be required to don a white beard that is not less than
eighteen inches in length, and shall punctuate crucial elements of his
testimony by stabbing the air with a wand. Whenever a psychologist or
psychiatrist provides expert testimony regarding the defendant's com-
petency, the bailiff shall... dim the courtroom lights and administer
two strikes to a Chinese gong.
Proposed amendment to bill in New Mexico Senate setting
licensing requirements for psychologists and psychiatrists.'
Some of 'em were like psychiatrists and stuff.., there just to give
their opinion in a psychiatry, psychiatric way.
Juror describing expert testimony at death penalty trial.2
- Professor of Law, Washington & Lee School of Law. Funding for the Capital Jury
Project was provided by National Science Foundation Grant SES 90-13252. The
research and writing of this Article was supported by the Frances Lewis Law Center.
I would like to thank Professors David Faigman, Chris Slobogin, John Monahan,
Richard Bonnie, Brian Murchison, William Geimer, and William Bowers for their
comments on earlier drafts of the Article and participants in faculty workshops at the
University of Florida School of Law and Washington & Lee School of Law. I also am
very grateful to the large number of students, too numerous to name individually, at
Hastings College of the Law and Washington & Lee who spent endless hours doing
logistical work, helping conduct the interviews, and processing the mountain of data.
Most of all, I thank those jurors who invested the time and emotion in helping us
begin to understand how juries make their decisions.
' S. Floor Amend. 1 to S.B. 459, 42d Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 1995).
2 Capital Jury Project (California) ("the Project"), Juror MD,. For an explanation of
codes used for jurors and methods of quotation, see infra note 33.
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I. INTRODUCTION
F one wants to spark a debate, few flints are as effective as the
issue of expert witnesses and their proper role. Whether it is
a solemn gathering of law professors or a television talk show,
almost everyone has an opinion about the escalating use of ex-
pert testimony, especially if it focuses on psychological theories
that have been popularly dubbed by some critics as "the abuse
excuse."3  Unlike even a decade ago, few law students now
graduate without having crossed paths in the normal course of
their studies with a number of legal defenses based upon social
science evidence.! And, courtesy of the media's coverage of high
profile trials like that of the Menendez brothers, non-lawyers also
are likely to be conversant with expert testimony on matters
such as battered woman or abused child trauma syndrome. The
increasing reliance on what Professors Walker and Monahan
have termed "social framework evidence" 5-- social science evi-
3 See Alan M. Dershowitz, The Abuse Excuse 38 (1994) (describing the problem of
"psychobabble" and arguing "we must not be seduced by the jargon of experts, par-
ticularly 'experts' who are really advocates for a particular political position or world-
view"); George P. Fletcher, With Justice for Some: Victims' Rights in Criminal Trials
234 (1995) (calling testimony of Menendez trial expert "pretentious babble" that would
be "laughable" except "there is a serious risk that when an expert takes the stand,
recites her qualifications, and the judge 'qualifies' her as someone who can speak
with authority, she can influence a jury's deliberations"). But see Richard J. Bonnie,
Excusing and Punishing in Criminal Adjudication: A Reality Check, 5 Cornell J.L. &
Pub. Pol'y 1, 7-9 (1995) (arguing that the perceived trend of abuse excuse is
"unadorned hyperbole" if one closely examines the cases and their facts).
'Consider, for example, that as recently as 1988, a survey found that only one of
seven leading criminal law textbooks included materials on battered woman syndrome.
Nancy S. Erickson, Sex Bias in Law School Courses: Some Common Issues, 38 J.
Legal Educ. 101, 105 (1988). Today, a criminal law casebook would be considered woe-
fully inadequate if it did not cover battered woman syndrome. Moreover, the casebook
is now likely to include materials on issues such as battered child syndrome and defenses
predicated on psychological disorders. See, e.g., Sanford H. Kadish & Stephen J. Schul-
hofer, Criminal Law and Its Processes 834-35, 1028-32 (6th ed. 1995) (excerpting
battered child syndrome case and reviewing psychological disorder defenses); John
Kaplan et al., Criminal Law 765-72 (1996) (examining post-traumatic stress syn-
drome, postpartum psychosis, premenstrual syndrome, and gambling disorder).
s Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social
Science in Law, 73 Va. L. Rev. 559, 563-70 (1987). While Professors Monahan and
Walker believe that social framework evidence generally is proper for jury consider-
ation, they advocate that social framework evidence be presented to the jury through
jury instructions rather than by expert testimony. Id. at 592-98.
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dence used to provide a jury a context within which disputed
factual issues may be understood-has intensified an already
long-standing dispute over the proper use of expert testimony.
Indeed, a burgeoning academic cottage industry has arisen over
when expert testimony, especially that concerning the "softer
sciences" such as psychiatry, should be allowed into evidence.'
Yet surprisingly, despite the extensive debate, we know rela-
tively little about how an expert witness's primary audience-
the jury-perceives expert testimony and uses it in its decision-
making. Studies have been done to assess the impact of expert
witness testimony pertaining to matters such as eyewitness reli-
ability,7 battered woman syndrome,8 and rape trauma syndrome,
6 Professors David Faigman and Stephen Morse have best articulated the arguments
against the introduction of social science evidence that has not been scientifically
validated. See, e.g., David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value
of Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 Emory L.J. 1005 (1989)
(proposing that social science evidence be subjected to a test of scientific validity);
Stephen J. Morse, Failed Explanations and Criminal Responsibility: Experts and the
Unconscious, 68 Va. L. Rev. 971 (1982) (challenging the validity and value of much
of the behavioral science used in criminal cases).
The seminal piece outlining the argument for the admission of such testimony is
Richard J. Bonnie & Christopher Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Professionals
in the Criminal Process: The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 Va. L. Rev. 427
(1980) (proposing that if adequate standards are maintained for the training and prac-
tice of mental health professionals, such experts have a proper role in criminal trials
for providing behavioral explanations to assist the fact finder). See also Andrew E.
Taslitz, Myself Alone: Individualizing Justice Through Psychological Character Evi-
dence, 52 Md. L. Rev. 1 (1993) (making comprehensive argument of how psycho-
logical character evidence can help achieve "individualized justice").
7 See, e.g., Steven D. Penrod & Brian L. Cutler, Eyewitness Expert Testimony and
Jury Decisionmaking, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1989, at 43 (simulated trial
studying effects of expert testimony on jurors' perception of eyewitness identification).
8 See, e.g., Regina A. Schuller & Neil Vidmar, Battered Woman Syndrome Evi-
dence in the Courtroom: A Review of the Literature, 16 Law & Hum. Behav. 273,274
(1992) (finding "substantial gaps in our knowledge" of how jurors use battered
woman evidence); Neil J. Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller, Juries and Expert Evidence:
Social Framework Testimony, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1989, at 133, 151-55
[hereinafter Vidmar & Schuller, Juries and Expert Evidence] (discussing Regina
Schuller, The Impact of Expert Testimony Pertaining to the "Battered Woman
Syndrome" on Jurors' Information Processing and Decisions (1990) (unpublished
doctoral dissertation, University of Western Ontario) (mock jury experiments using
expert evidence on battered woman syndrome)).
9 See, e.g., Nancy Brekke & Eugene Borgida, Expert Psychological Testimony in
Rape Trials: A Social-Cognitive Analysis, 55 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 372 (1988)
(mock juror study on effect of rape trauma syndrome evidence); Patricia Frazier &
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but they tend to rely upon mock juries and simulated trial set-
tings. As Professors Vidmar and Schuller noted after a compre-
hensive review of the literature:
There have been no attempts to interview real jurors who have
served in trials involving matters where social framework evi-
dence might be relevant. Particularly when expert evidence has
been tendered, the reactions and observations of jurors could
provide much insight about the impact of such testimony....
There [also] has been an unwarranted emphasis on the re-
sponses of individual jurors when the actual focus of concern is
how twelve.., men and women pool their insights to reach a
decision.... Yet most empirical researchers have only made in-
ferences about the deliberations from the variables manipu-
lated in the experiments and from the resulting verdicts.'0
Thus, numerous questions remain about how actual juries react
to expert testimony: Do juries simply defer to the expert's cre-
dentials and abdicate their fact-finding responsibilities? How
do juries react to "battles of the experts"? Can juries under-
stand and properly integrate expert testimony into their deci-
sionmaking process? How do jurors react to professional expert
testimony compared to testimony from other types of witnesses,
such as lay experts?1
This Article attempts to provide some initial empirical an-
swers to these questions by looking at how jurors in capital cases
view and use different types of witness testimony presented
during the guilt and penalty phases. Specifically, it draws upon
the findings of the Capital Jury Project ("the Project"), a project
funded by the National Science Foundation to study the deci-
sionmaking process of capital juries nationwide.12 The data for
this Article come from the California segment of the Project,3 in
Eugene Borgida, 12 Law & Hum. Behav. 101 (1988) (comparing expert and non-
expert understandings of rape trauma syndrome).
,0 Vidmar & Schuller, Juries and Expert Evidence, supra note 8, at 175-76.
"See generally David McCord, Syndromes, Profiles and Other Mental Exotica: A
New Approach to the Admissibility of Nontraditional Psychological Evidence in Crim-
inal Cases, 66 Or. L. Rev. 19, 33, 88 (1987) (noting lack of empirical data on how
jurors process expert testimony concerning nontraditional psychological evidence).
1 See generally William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and
Preview of Early Findings, 70 Ind. LJ. 1043 (1995) (describing the Project's purposes
and procedures).
"1 The author was the Principal Investigator of the California segment of the Project.
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which 152 jurors were interviewed. These jurors had served on
36 cases in which the defendant was convicted of first-degree
murder and the jury was then asked to return a sentence of
death." Of the 36 cases, 18 resulted in a death sentence, 17 led
to a sentence of life without parole, and one case ended in a
hung jury over the penalty.'5 Each juror participated in an ex-
tensive interview, 6 answering questions designed to elicit both
qualitative and quantitative data regarding how her jury delib-
erated and what factors influenced its decision. The data used
in this Article are drawn both from questions specifically about
expert witnesses and more general questions aimed at exploring
the jury's deliberative process and how the juror-interviewees
arrived at their individual decisions.
Before proceeding with this Article's findings on jurors' per-
ceptions of different witnesses' testimony, several methodologi-
cal matters should be noted. First, capital jurors do not com-
pletely mirror all potential jurors, because jurors cannot serve
on a capital jury if they are opposed to the death penalty and
their opposition would affect their ability to render a fair ver-
dict.'7 Likewise, jurors are prohibited from serving if they can-
4The 36 cases were tried during the years 1988-92, and the interviews were
conducted during 1991-92. The cases were drawn from a geographic area of six coun-
ties in the middle one-third of the state. For a case to qualify for the study, the trial
had to have taken place within three years, with priority given to interviewing jurors
from the more recently decided cases. Cases were selected so as to maintain a
balance between life and death outcomes and with an effort to obtain a mix of trials
based on factors such as region and type of offense. See generally Bowers, supra
note 12, at 1077-81 (explaining the Project's sampling methodology).
,'As allowed under California law, Cal. Penal Code § 190.4(b) (West 1988), the
penalty phase of this case was retried before a different jury. The retrial resulted in a
death sentence and is one of the 18 death cases from which jurors were interviewed.
11 Interviews ranged in time from two to twelve hours, averaging from three to four
hours. The questionnaire was a 50-page document that the interviewer filled out as
the interviewee orally responded to the questions. If the interviewee agreed, as most
did, the interview was tape-recorded; otherwise, the interviewer wrote down the
juror's responses.
"1 A juror may be excluded for cause if the juror's views would "'prevent or sub-
stantially impair' their ability to follow the state's statutory scheme governing the
death penalty. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Texas,
448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)). The questions that jurors are asked regarding whether their
views on capital punishment would affect their ability to be impartial are known as
the "Witherspoon questions." See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520-23 &
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not fairly consider mitigation evidence arguing against a death
sentence and, therefore, would always impose a death sentence
for first-degree murder.18 Consequently, individuals who are at
one end or the other of the spectrum in their attitudes on the
death penalty will not be reflected in the jury sample. 9
Second, all of the jurors in the sample voted to convict the de-
fendant at the guilt stage. Thus, while the sample reflects the
full spectrum of jury verdicts at the penalty phase-approxi-
mately half of the jurors served on juries that returned death
sentences and half sat on juries that imposed life sentences-the
attitudes of jurors whose juries acquitted at the guilt stage are
not reflected. As a result, a possibility exists that jurors who ac-
quit at the guilt stage of capital trials may have different atti-
tudes towards witnesses and expert testimony than the inter-
viewed jurors.'
What the Project does offer is a rich opportunity to contrast
how jurors perceive, use, and compare different categories of
witnesses and testimony. This is because the typical capital trial,
especially the penalty phase, involves a wide variety of witnesses
giving extensive testimony on subjects ranging from DNA to eth-
n.21 (1968) (limiting dismissal of capital venire members to those who indicate they
could never impose the death penalty).
18 Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 83-85 (1988) (noting that juror must be removed
for cause if he would automatically vote for the death penalty if the defendant was
found guilty).
19 Research has indicated that the exclusion of individuals who could not impose a
death sentence makes the resulting "death-qualified" jury more conviction-prone at
the guilt stage. See Phoebe C. Ellsworth, To Tell What We Know or Wait for Godot?,
15 Law & Hum. Behav. 77 (1991); Claudia L. Cowan et al., The Effects of Death
Qualification on Jurors' Predisposition to Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8
Law & Hum. Behav. 53 (1984). One study found that while death-qualified jurors
were more likely to reject an insanity defense based upon a nonorganic brain
disorder, they were not significantly less likely to believe psychiatric testimony than
those who were excludable because of opposition to the death penalty. Phoebe C.
Ellsworth et al., The Death-Qualified Jury and the Defense of Insanity, 8 Law &
Hum. Behav. 81,88-89 (1984).
In Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986), the Supreme Court criticized the
methodologies of studies finding death-qualified juries to be more conviction-prone.
Id. at 168-73. The Court further held that even if skewing does occur, it does not
violate the Constitution. Id. at 173.
For a general methodological critique of the Project, see Christopher Slobogin,
Should Juries and the Death Penalty Mix?: A Prediction About the Supreme Court's
Answer, 70 Ind. L.J. 1249, 1254-56 (1995).
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nic rage. Consequently, if one wants to examine whether jurors
react differently to expert and non-expert testimony and deter-
mine how they perceive so-called "abuse excuse" defenses, capi-
tal trials offer a fairly wide-open window into the jury room.
This Article will explore what a look through that window re-
veals. Its principal finding is that the messenger is often as im-
portant as the message in presenting evidence to the jury. In a
setting such as a capital case where the lawyer has a variety of
choices of how to communicate information to the jury, the jury
will have biases for and against different types of witnesses that
must be taken into account. For instance, far from being over-
awed by experts' credentials, this Article will demonstrate that
juries tend to view experts as "hired guns" who are cloistered
from the real world, rather than as objective authorities who
understand what is really happening on the streets. By contrast,
juries find certain types of lay witnesses particularly persuasive
precisely because they are seen as trustworthy and full of
worldly knowledge.
Even these generalizations, however, are too simplistic, be-
cause much turns on context and how the different testimony is
orchestrated. Indeed, this Article's findings suggest that it would
be beneficial for the trial attorney to think of the presentation of
evidence as comparable to composing a musical score, with much
depending on how the different witness types are harmonized.
Each type of witness can make a contribution to the symphony,
but some witness types are better used as accompanists rather
than as soloists. And it falls most importantly to the trial attor-
ney, as the composer, to ensure that the various witnesses are
used so as to minimize dissonance and enhance harmony. But
before we see how the symphony-goers, the jurors, view the dif-
ferent instrumental arrangements, one needs to understand the
structure of a capital trial and the variety of witnesses who testify.
1997] 1115
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IH. THE CAPITAL TRIAL AND THE ROLE OF DIFFERENT
TYPES OF WITNESSES
A. Presenting the Capital Case: Experts, Lay Experts, and
"Family and Friends"
To become eligible for imposition of the death penalty in
California, a jury first must find that the defendant is guilty of
first-degree murder2' and that at least one additional statutory
condition, called a "special circumstance,"' exists. As a general
matter, the jury decides both the first-degree murder charge and
the existence of any special circumstances as part of the same
proceeding.' The statutory list of special circumstances is rather
lengthy and is an attempt to identify those aggravating factors
that characterize the most egregious murders.' The jury, for in-
stance, may be asked to determine if the defendant intentionally
targeted a particular type of victim, such as a prosecutor or
judge, or whether the killing occurred during a particular type
of felony, such as robbery or rape. 6 Even with the additional re-
21 Cal. Penal Code § 189, 190.2(a) (West Supp. 1997) (defining first-degree murder
as a premeditated killing or a killing during the course of an enumerated felony).
22Id. § 190.2.
Id. § 190.1(a) (West 1988). The only statutory exception to having the jury deter-
mine both first-degree murder and special circumstances in the same proceeding is if
the special circumstance is a prior murder. In that case, to avoid prejudicing the
defendant, the jury does not hear about the prior murder or deliberate on it as a
special circumstance until after the defendant is convicted of first-degree murder. Id.
§ 190.1(b).
24 Id. § 190.2. This narrowing of who is eligible for the death penalty is constitu-
tionally required by the Supreme Court. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983)
(stating that factors making defendant death-eligible "must genuinely narrow the class
of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of
a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder").
See generally Scott E. Sundby, The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion
and Unguided Mitigation in Capital Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 1147, 1162-64
(1991) (describing the Court's requirement of a bifurcated decisionmaking process to
accommodate the need for both "guided discretion" and "individualized considera-
tion" in capital sentencing).
"Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(11)-(12) (West Supp. 1997).
26 Id. § 190.2(17). At one time the California Supreme Court had interpreted the
felony-murder circumstance as requiring an intent to kill. Carlos v. Superior Court,
672 P.2d 862, 877 (Cal. 1983) (en banc). The court, however, later held that an intent
to kill for the felony-murder circumstance is only required where the defendant was
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quirement of finding special circumstances, though, the guilt
stage of a capital case largely resembles that of any first-degree
murder case: Each side calls lay witnesses to dispute whether
certain historical facts occurred, and expert testimony focuses
on traditional legal issues such as premeditation, insanity, or
self-defense.
Once the jury finds the defendant guilty and identifies one or
more special circumstances at the guilt phase, the only two pos-
sible penalties under California law are life without parole or
the death penalty.' If the prosecutor seeks the death penalty, a
penalty trial is held during which the prosecution can present
aggravating evidence arguing for a death sentence (such as a de-
fendant's history of violent crime) and the defense can present
mitigating evidence arguing for a sentence of life without parole.
The penalty phase is a much more open evidentiary affair
than the guilt phase. Under the United States Supreme Court's
holding in Lockett v. Ohio,' a defendant constitutionally must
be allowed to present "any aspect of [his] character or record
and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death."29 The focus at
this stage of the legal proceedings is on the defendant's overall
moral culpability, and the defense is no longer limited to formal
legal defenses? Consequently, testimony at the penalty phase
often will be more far-reaching than that presented at the guilt
phase, both as to the testimony's subject matter in general and
as to explanations for the defendant's behavior in particular.
For example, the jury may hear about the defendant's upbring-
ing, his artistic abilities, his ability to adjust to prison, or possible
psychological reasons for his criminal act.31
an accomplice and not the actual killer. People v. Anderson, 742 P.2d 1306, 1325
(Cal. 1987). The study's cases took place after the Anderson decision.
17 Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a).
- 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
29 Id. at 604 (plurality opinion).
30 See Sundby, supra note 24, at 1162-64 (discussing scope of mitigating evidence
under Lockett).
31 For a thorough and at times moving look at mitigating factors common to capital
defendants, see Craig Haney, The Social Context of Capital Murder: Social Histories
and the Logic of Mitigation, 35 Santa Clara L. Rev. 547 (1995).
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As the range of subject matter eligible for jury consideration
broadens significantly at the penalty phase, the potential sources
for conveying such information likewise expand. One need not
have a Ph.D. to explain to the jury how the defendant was abused
as a child, nor must one be an expert on prisons to describe how
the defendant has adapted to incarceration. As a general prop-
osition, penalty-phase witnesses fall into three categories: profes-
sional experts, lay experts, and "family and friends" witnesses.
Professional experts are those who profess an expertise based
upon training and study beyond the knowledge of the average
juror. They usually have no preexisting connection to the de-
fendant, but appear in the case for a fee because of their par-
ticular expertise. Their knowledge of the defendant is obtained
specifically for the purpose of assisting in the case either by ad-
vising the attorney, by giving testimony, or both. Although there
are many different types of professional experts, the classic ex-
pert in a capital case is a psychiatrist or psychologist who has
conducted a mental evaluation of the defendant, has examined
the defendant's background in looking for medical and psycho-
logical explanations for the defendant's behavior, and is prepared
to explain to the jury why the defendant may have behaved in a
criminal fashion.
A lay expert is someone who has particular knowledge of the
defendant's situation through the lay expert's own experiences
and who has insights to offer because of those experiences. The
experiences may come from prior interaction with the defendant
himself (for example, having been the defendant's prison guard),
from having lived the same experiences as the defendant (having
been the victim of incest herself), or both. As a general matter,
even if acquainted with the defendant prior to the case, the lay
expert is someone who would not be perceived as having a per-
sonal bias for the defendant. She usually is not paid for her tes-
timony, nor does -she have a personal relationship with the de-
fendant. Thus, the lay expert still offers "expertise" to the jury
in the sense that she can inform the jury of matters about the
defendant or the defendant's circumstances that the jury other-
wise would not know, but her expertise is derived directly from
her experiences with the defendant or his situation rather than
from professional training or study.
1118 [Vol. 83:1109
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The final category of "family and friends" is self-defining: At
the penalty phase, the defendant's parents, siblings, and friends
frequently testify before the jury in mitigation. The nature of
the testimony, however, can be quite diverse, ranging from raw
emotional appeals for sparing the defendant's life to a detailed
accounting of the defendant's childhood. The distinctive mark
of this category of testimony, of course, is the intensely personal
nature of the defendant's relationship with the witness.
B. The Prominent Role of Experts in Capital Trials
Given the variety of potential witnesses, the trial attorney's
critical task is choosing the witnesses who will be most effective
in communicating with the jury. A mitigation case centered on
the defendant's history as a victim of incest, for example, could
be presented through a professional expert such as a psychia-
trist, a lay expert such as an incest victim who now counsels
other victims, family members who knew of the incest (including
perhaps the perpetrator himself), or a combination of such wit-
nesses." While the cases in the Project varied widely in their use
of lay experts and family witnesses, one striking aspect was the
prevalent use of expert witnesses, especially at the penalty phase.
In 30 of the 36 cases (83%), the defense called a professional
expert to testify at the penalty phase. The prosecution likewise
relied heavily upon professional experts at the penalty phase, pre-
senting its own expert testimony in 27 of the 36 cases (75%). The
proportion of cases involving expert testimony is even greater
when one accounts for two cases that were "uncontested" at the
penalty phase; in these two cases, the prosecution did not pres-
"1 The mitigation case at Susan Smith's trial for driving a car into a lake and killing
her two small children, for example, largely was built around the psychological effects
she suffered as an incest victim. In presenting the mitigation case, Smith's attorneys
presented a wide array of witnesses, among whom were a psychiatrist at the guilt
phase, State v. Smith, Nos. 94-GS-44-906 and 94-GS-44-907, 1995 WL 578226, record
at *19 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. July 21, 1995), and then, at the penalty phase of the trial: a
number of family members and friends, Smith, 1995 WL 702707, record at *15 (July
26, 1995); Smith, 1995 WL 789246, record at *9, *20, *23, *26, *28, *78 (July 27,
1995); a corrections officer, id., record at *42; family and pastoral counselors, id.,
record at *37, *69; a social worker, Smith, 1995 WL 702707, record at *22; a chaplain,
Smith, 1995 WL 789246, record at *71; and a letter her stepfather wrote to her and
read in court apologizing for molesting her, id., record at *65-*69.
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ent any aggravating evidence but simply relied on the guilt-stage
evidence, while the defense attorneys, in turn, did not put on
any witnesses but only made closing arguments to the jury.3 In
a third case, the defense did not call an expert witness because
the defendant appeared pro se at the penalty phase. He told the
jury that it had wrongly convicted him and, therefore, they
might as well give him the death penalty. The jury acceded to
his wishes. Thus, if one excludes the two uncontested cases and
the pro se case, the defense actually relied upon professional
expert testimony in 30 of the 33 fully contested cases (90%), and
the prosecution used expert testimony in 27 of the 33 (81%). It
is evident that conventional practice at the penalty phase in-
volves presenting an expert to the jury at some point-in many
cases more than one-who will testify based upon an expertise
gained through training and study.
Expert witnesses play such a prominent role in capital cases
for several reasons. First, they are readily available. Courts natu-
rally tend to be more solicitous of defense requests for state-
funded experts in capital cases given the grave consequences at
stake and the greater potential for appellate reversal in capital
cases?' The Supreme Court gave constitutional reinforcement
33 While the prosecutor formally asked for the death penalty in these two cases, the
jurors in both cases did not see the prosecution as really wanting a death sentence.
Jurors in those cases remarked along the lines that the "prosecution didn't really
push for the death penalty," (FL,), and the "prosecutor was not terribly invested in
what the punishment would be," (F2L).
To protect the anonymity of the interviewed jurors, as has been done with other
articles on the Project, quoted jurors are identified by "M" and "F" to indicate their
gender, followed by a sequentially assigned number based upon when the juror is
first quoted in the Article. The second designation indicates whether the jury in the
case returned a life sentence ("L"), death sentence ("D"), or hung on the sentence
("H"), followed by a sequentially assigned number for the case.
All of the quotations'in this Article have been checked for accuracy and corrected
against the primary source (i.e., the tape or interviewer's notes) by the Author. The
Article's descriptions of cases and witnesses are based on the jurors' recollections of the
trial. Bracketed material has been used where necessary to protect anonymity or to
clarify the context of a quotation. All materials are on file with the Author so as to
preserve confidentiality.
34The estimated reversal rate for death penalty cases between 1976-91 was 60%.
James S. Liebman, More than "Slightly Retro": The Rehnquist Court's Rout of
Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction in Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 537,
541 n.15 (1990-91). As a comparison, the reversal rate in federal non-capital criminal
1120 [Vol. 83:1109
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to this tendency in Ake v. Oklahoma,35 holding that an indigent
defendant is entitled under due process to the appointment of a
psychiatrist for both the guilt and penalty phases if the defen-
dant shows that his mental health at the time of the offense will
be an issue at trial.36 Indeed, some states now statutorily provide
for the appointment of a mental health expert for a capital de-
fendant as a matter of course in preparation for trial.37 Moreo-
ver, most courts have read Ake as extending beyond psychiatric
experts and have appointed a wide range of experts under the
holding's aegis. 8 The guilt phase of a capital trial, therefore, of-
ten involves expert testimony on issues such as the fallibility of
eyewitness identifications or whether the use of crack cocaine
would have precluded the defendant from premeditating a kill-
ing. 9 And, as one would expect under Lockett,' the role of ex-
perts is even more expansive at the penalty phase and may touch
on subjects ranging from ethnicity to the defendant's adaptabil-
ity to prison life."
Ready access to experts alone might be enough to make capi-
tal litigation expert-oriented, but the allure of the expert witness
is particularly powerful for a defense attorney appointed to rep-
resent a capital defendant. A capital defense attorney, espe-
cially one new to death penalty litigation, can easily become
judgments that were appealed was 6.5%. Id. (citing Jack Greenberg, Capital Punish-
ment as a System, 91 Yale LJ. 908, 918 (1982)).
"470 U.S. 68 (1985).
6Id. at 83.
37 See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1 (Michie Supp. 1997) (entitling an indigent
capital defendant to court appointment of "one or more qualified mental health ex-
perts to evaluate the defendant and to assist the defense in the preparation and pre-
sentation of information concerning the defendant's history, character, or mental
condition").
3See Rey v. State, 897 S.W.2d 333, 338 n.4, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc)
(reviewing cases extending Ake to non-psychiatric experts and holding that Ake gives
defendant a right to appointment of a pathologist).
3 See, e.g., infra notes 62-63, 79 and accompanying text (discussing juror reactions
to experts on eyewitness identification and crack cocaine).
40 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
41 See, e.g., infra notes 61, 80-85 and accompanying text (discussing juror reactions
to experts on ethnic background and prison life). See C. Robert Showalter & Richard J.
Bonnie, Psychiatrists and Capital Sentencing: Risks and Responsibilities in a Unique
Legal Setting, 12 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry L. 159, 160 (1984) ("By requiring the
states to individualize the capital sentencing process, the Supreme Court virtually has
assured routine participation by psychiatric (or other clinical) experts.").
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paralyzed with the daunting nature of the task that lies before
her: the emotional weight of knowing that someone's life largely
rests in her hands, a body of state and federal law governing
capital punishment that makes the Internal Revenue Code look
simplistic, the need to file endless motions to ensure that no po-
tential issue is defaulted, and the necessity of preparing for es-
sentially two trials---one on guilt and the other on the death pen-
alty.42 To learn, therefore, that the appointment of -an expert
witness in a capital trial requires only the filing of a motion can
offer a great sense of relief and enable the attorney to feel as if
she is moving forward.43
While the extensive use of experts in capital trials is under-
standable and certainly helpful for one studying jurors' views of
experts, the question remains whether such heavy reliance on
expert testimony is an effective trial strategy. Do juries find ex-
perts to be persuasive witnesses? Can expert testimony in fact
hurt one's case? How do juries view experts compared to other
types of witnesses? These are the questions to which we now
turn.
III. JURORS' PERCEPTIONS OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF WITNESSES
A complete picture of how juries react to various types of
witnesses can only emerge from a full review of the jurors' de-
scriptions of what factors influenced them and the nature of the
jury's deliberations. An initial snapshot of how jurors assess dif-
ferent types of witnesses, however, can be obtained by looking
at responses to several questions designed to determine which
witnesses the juror found most influential, both positively and
negatively. Specifically, the jurors were asked whether, for the
prosecution or defense, any guilt-phase witnesses were particu-
larly hard to believe, what evidence or testimony was most in-
42 William S. Geimer, Law and Reality in the Capital Penalty Trial, 18 N.Y.U. Rev.
L. & Soc. Change 273, 280 (1990-91) ("[P]reparing to present [a theory of mitigation]
requires extensive research and investigation far exceeding anything conducted in
preparation for non-capital trials. Yet even the basics of this task can confound
capital defense counsel.").
41 This observation is based in part on the Author's experiences as Co-Director of
the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse (1992-93, 1995-96), a law school clinic which
provides pretrial assistance to attorneys appointed to represent capital defendants.
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fluential at the penalty phase, and whether any penalty-phase
evidence "backfired." These questions, therefore, tended to elicit
recollections of the most memorable witnesses from the trial-
those witnesses who left either a very positive or negative im-
pression on the jurors such that they immediately responded to
the interview questions with a response of, "You should have
heard ......
The data indicates that professional expert witnesses were
viewed negatively in a significant portion of the cases, especially
experts called by the defense. Indeed, professional experts ac-
counted for two-thirds of all juror references to defense wit-
nesses as backfiring or being hard to believe, but for only about
one-fifth of juror references to defense witnesses as positively
influential. Roughly speaking, jurors' impressions of defense ex-
pert witnesses were more than twice as likely to be negative
rather than positive. ' Nor was it simply a few experts generat-
ing the negative impressions, as jurors negatively cited 27 differ-
ent defense experts in 18 cases at either the guilt or penalty
stages. By contrast, only 9 defense experts in a total of 8 cases
were identified as positive influences at either the guilt or pen-
alty phases. '
Further perspective on the difficulties juries have with de-
fense experts can be gained by comparing the negative to posi-
' This data does not include "fact witnesses" at the guilt stage whom the attorneys
had no choice but to call, such as eyewitnesses. For instance, in a case involving one
prisoner's killing of another prisoner, both the prosecution and defense had to call
prisoners to testify about the killing because no other types of witnesses were avail-
able. The jury was not impressed with the inmate witnesses for either side, as they
were highly uncooperative. This section focuses on where the attorneys voluntarily
elected to put on a certain type of witness--expert, lay expert, or family/friend-to
establish a proposition.
41 Of 56 references to defense witnesses as backfiring, 38 were to professional expert
witnesses. Of 69 references to defense witnesses as being influential in a positive
manner, 15 were to professional experts. The number of negative references to
experts (38) thus was more than twice as great as the number of positive references (15).
4 Six of the "positive" and "negative" cases overlap in that jurors identified, in the
same case, both a positively influential defense expert and a backfiring defense
expert (making 20 cases overall where defense experts were identified as positive
and/or negative influences). Interestingly, in only four instances was the same expert
characterized by one or more jurors as a positive witness and by a different juror or
jurors as a negative witness. Jurors within a given jury thus tended to agree on
whether a particular expert was a "good" or "bad" witness.
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tive ratio for the defense's professional experts to the other two
categories of witnesses. The professional experts come out far
worse. "Family and friends" witnesses, for instance, were named
as a positive influence for the defense case 39 times and as back-
firing witnesses only 15 times, a ratio that is almost the mirror
opposite of the ratio for experts (15 positive references, 38 nega-
tive references). And although not used as witnesses as often as
were professional experts or family and friends, lay experts en-
joyed an even more favorable positive to negative impression
ratio, as jurors named them as among the most influential wit-
nesses 15 times and saw them as backfiring on only 3 occasions.
Thus, the good news for defense experts is that their testi-
mony tends to be remembered (jurors mentioned a defense ex-
pert witness as memorable in 20 of the 30 cases in which experts
testified); the bad news is that they tend to be remembered for
not being credible. But before jumping to the conclusion that
professional experts inherently make a negative impression, it is
fruitful to take a look at two more sets of data.
First, positive impressions of defense experts at the penalty
stage correlated with a subsequent life sentence. Indeed, of the
six cases in which a defense expert at the penalty phase was
cited favorably by the jurors, all resulted in a life sentence
While this is not to say that a favorably received expert is a pre-
requisite to obtaining a life sentence, ' it does suggest-even ac-
counting for a "halo effect" in which the expert's image benefits
from the existence of other, strong mitigation evidence 49 -that
47 Even then, however, in two of the six cases, the same defense expert was also
recalled negatively by at least one juror.
48 That a favorably received expert is not essential to receiving a life sentence can
be seen in the fact that a life sentence was returned in seven of the contested cases
where a defense expert was not identified as influential and in two cases where the
defense expert was cited only as being a negative influence. By contrast, in the 15
contested life cases, 13 involved family witnesses who were viewed as influential in a
favorable manner. Lay experts were cited in five of the contested life cases as highly
influential. This last number is misleadingly low, however, because lay experts,
unlike professional experts and family members, were not widely utilized and were
rarely seen as "backfiring" when they did testify.
4
9 Likewise, there appears to be a possibility of a "pitchfork effect," by which a
defense expert's image suffers from a weak defense case. Of the 14 cases where a
defense expert at the penalty phase was perceived as backfiring, ten resulted in a
death sentence and only four came back with life sentences. It may be that the
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positively received expert testimony heightens the chance of a
life sentence.
The second set of figures pertains to prosecution witnesses.
Here, the jurors' reactions were not nearly so negatively skewed
against professional experts. Of the 12 prosecution witnesses
cited negatively, only 3 were professional experts, while 14 of the
50 witnesses who were viewed as most influential were experts.
The professional experts called by the prosecution, therefore,
enjoyed a far better positive to negative ratio than did the de-
fense experts. Why would this be so?
While it is possible the prosecution obtains better expert wit-
nesses, a more likely explanation lies in the differences between
how the prosecution's expert witnesses and the defense's experts
are used in capital cases. Most of the prosecution experts identi-
fied as positive influences were used primarily as rebuttal wit-
nesses to neutralize the defendant's case rather than to advance
independent theories about the defendant.' That is, the prose-
cution expert's role as a witness was to explain to the jury how
the defense experts' theories were not true-for example, the
defendant did know the difference between right and wrong-
and why, therefore, the defense expert should not be believed.
The importance of this difference in the expert witness's role
becomes far more understandable if one moves beyond the
numbers to the substance of what jurors said about the expert
testimony they heard.
A. The Jurors' Critique of Expert Testimony
In analyzing jurors' comments, three consistent criticisms of
professional expert testimony emerge: (1) experts are viewed as
"hired guns"; (2) jurors are skeptical of experts and their ability
to explain human behavior; and (3) experts often fail to draw a
link between their testimony and the defendant's specific situa-
tion. Each theme will be looked at in turn.
experts were viewed negatively in part because the jury was rejecting the defendant's
case in mitigation and, in the process, forming negative impressions of those who
presented it.
-1 In addition to these rebuttal-type expert witnesses, the favorably viewed prose-
cution experts included those who testified at the guilt stage of the trial about the
facts of the killing-medical examiners, forensic experts, and a DNA expert.
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1. Experts as "Hired Guns"
Textbook strategy for cross-examining professional expert
witnesses is to question them about their fees in an effort to
show bias,51 and it appears the strategy often works. Jurors com-
monly believed that experts would skew their testimony for
"whoever is paying for their testimony." (FL). 52 Some jurors
used the phrase "professional witness" to describe derogatorily
expert witnesses who testified: "He was the kind of psychologist
that's just in there testifying for the money.... He was a profes-
sional witness for [the] defense or whatever, whoever needed
him." (F4D2). "A defense psychiatrist was discredited and shown
to have been a professional witness." (FD3). 3 As one juror ex-
plained with a bit more gusto:
Juror: There didn't seem to be any conflicting evidence ex-
cept for the expert witnesses. Well, they were just on opposite
sides and opposite opinions. And they were evasive in their
answers to the opposing attorney.
Interviewer: And these were all of them?
51 As Francis Busch has observed:
Showing that an expert witness is being paid a substantial fee for his services
undoubtedly subjects his testimony to some discount .... [A]n alert cross-
examiner will usually follow [up a general question on direct examination of
whether the expert is being paid] with a sharply put question: "How much do
you expect to be paid?"
Francis X. Busch, Law and Tactics in Jury Trials: The Art of Jury Persuasion 636
(1949). See also Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis. L. Rev. 1113, 1168
(cross-examination of experts about fees has "special bite"). If, on the other hand, a
defense expert will not financially benefit from her testimony, a wise defense strategy
is to highlight that fact for the jury. See State v. Smith, Nos. 94-GS-44-906 and
94-GS-44-907, 1995 WL 578226, record at *26, (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. July 21, 1995),
during which a defense expert for Susan Smith explained that, as a salaried em-
ployee, his fee of $150 an hour would be remitted directly to his employer. This fact
enabled defense counsel to ask rhetorically, "So if you had said, 'No, thank you,'
when I asked to you [sic] handle this case, you would not have made a penny less?"
The expert replied, "That's correct." Id.
For an explanation of codes used for jurors and methods of quotation, see supra
note 33.
3 The juror continued, "He looked like he was testifying solely for the money....
They asked him how much money he makes for his testimony and that totally
discredited him." (FD,). Another juror in the same case similarly characterized the
expert, noting that the "D.A. brought out that he testified frequently for the defense
in the past, he did it for money." (FD3).
1126
The Jury as Critic
Juror: All of them. And like I said, if it was my kid I woulda
slapped him upside the head and told him, "Go to your room."
Interviewer: The experts?
Juror: Sure, when they were being cross-examined they were
very evasive. Because they want to collect their fee, you know.
They get paid for doing it. One guy, it was his full time job. He
was terrible. It's just, his main source of income was being a
part-time worker at a university and a professional witness.
Interviewer: Quite a living, huh?
Juror: You're not kidding. (M2L4).
The jurors' perceptions of experts as "professional witnesses"
were sometimes further inflamed by the large fees collected by
the experts. One juror, for instance, referred to the defense ex-
perts as "two high-priced doctors," (F7D1), and another juror
remembered very specifically the sum charged by the expert:
The final witness was [Dr. X], a practicing clinical psychologist
and teacher, who was hired by the defense to put together a
psychological profile .... It was rather exasperating that at $200
per hour for over 240 hours of his time-which equates to
$48,000 of taxpayer dollars-he really didn't tell us anything we
hadn't learned already from witnesses and family members.
(F8L5).
The perception is exacerbated by the fact that the defendant is
already seen by many jurors as having an abundance of re-
sources, such as two attorneys.' A parade of defense experts
can only add fuel to that notion:
'4 Because of the difficulty of preparing for both the guilt and penalty phases of a
capital case, the standard and necessary practice for almost all capital trials is to have
two defense attorneys. See Cal. Penal Code § 987(d) (West Supp. 1997) (authorizing
appointment of second attorney in capital case by trial judge); Keenan v. Superior
Court, 640 P.2d 108, 113 (Cal. 1982) (holding that trial judge abuses discretion in not
appointing second attorney "[ijf it appears that a second attorney may lend important
assistance in preparing for trial or presenting the case"). See also American Bar Ass'n,
American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases 41 (1989) ("In cases where the death penalty is
sought, two qualified trial attorneys should be assigned ... ."); id. at 41-44 (noting
reasons why at least two attorneys are necessary to represent competently a capital
defendant).
Some jurors, however, viewed the presence of two defense attorneys negatively.
One juror felt, for instance, that it was unfair for "both of them [the two defense
attorneys] to gang up against this real top gun prosecutor." (F9D,).
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Interviewer: Is there anything about this case that sticks in
your mind, or that you keep thinking about?
Juror: [W]e spend so much money to defend a person like
that. He had all kinds of defense-he had two lawyers, he had
even a psychological test that was even recognized by the court...
it cost a great deal of money. And why spend all that money on
that awful criminal? He had never been good for anything any-
way. So that really stuck with me forever. I tried to figure out
the amount and it's really tremendous. (F10D,).
Because jurors largely believe that the experts are testifying
primarily to collect their fees, any perceived conflict of interest
is especially likely to be looked at unforgivingly. In one case,
for instance, the defense called experts who had used a "brain
mapping machine" to conduct tests on the defendant.
Interviewer: Why did you find [the brain expert's] testimony
hard to believe?
Juror: Because he owned the machine, [and was] trying to
justify it. (M3D,).
Another juror described the same testimony as backfiring, first
noting:
One of the witnesses did some kind of special test, it was kind
of like a brain mapping test.... The girl that ran the test and
one of the doctors that spoke for the defendant-turns out they
own like twenty-five percent ownership of this machine. Little
bit of interest here. (M4D6).
Then, the juror turned more blunt, calling the experts "partners
in crime" and concluding that "one of the psychologists was to-
tally unbelievable. He was part owner of the machine.... He was
just a dishonest person-a weasel." (M4D6). This same juror had
stated earlier that he did not trust experts because "you could
hire experts to say whatever you want them to say," so he was
perhaps particularly open to being convinced of a conflict of in-
terest.
The perception of expert witnesses as "hired guns" will, as a
general rule, be most disadvantageous to the defense, because
most prosecution experts-pathologists, ballistics experts, psy-
chiatrists, and the like-are on the government payroll as regu-
lar employees and are not paid specifically for their work in the
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case before the jury. And while a government employee cer-
tainly qualifies as someone with a potential bias for the prosecu-
tion, the jurors' comments strongly indicate that it does not have
the same pyrotechnic effect as bringing out on cross-examin-
ation that a defense expert charged the taxpayers a hundred
dollars an hour or more. Indeed, only one juror made com-
ments indicating an acceptance of the fact that there is a role for
paid professional experts:
[The prosecutor asked the defense psychiatrist] how many
times do you testify for the defense and how many times do
you testify for the prosecuting attorney. Well, he testified a lot
more times for the defense.... My thing was maybe that's
good. That people commit crimes for good reasons, and he's
helping, and it didn't shock me like, "He's a paid defense wit-
ness expert."... [However, the others] felt he was very unpro-
fessional .... (F 1D3).
Perhaps not coincidentally, this sole juror was a nurse and thus
used to working with doctors.55
Interestingly, the jurors' distrust of defense experts coincides
with studies of jurors' attitudes towards experts in civil cases.
Interviews of jurors in antitrust, asbestos, and medical malprac-
tice litigation all found jurors skeptical of the economic, medi-
cal, and actuarial experts who had testified. 6 As with this Arti-
cle's jurors, the skepticism that the civil jurors expressed was in
"This juror's familiarity with the medical profession might also explain her dif-
ferent reaction to the psychiatrist's billing practices compared to the other jurors:
The other jurors thought he was very unprofessional, he didn't have knowledge
of the exact amount of money that he charged the court for his expertise....
He said, "Oh, is that important? All right," opened his briefcase and got out
his calculator [and said], "I'll figure it for you." So they thought that was very
unprofessional ... and I just thought, well geez, probably he has an accountant or
a secretary who handles all the billing and makes his appointments. (F,1D3).
-1 See Arthur D. Austin, Complex Litigation Confronts the Jury System: A Case
Study 82 (1984) (finding jurors with strongly "negative feelings" toward an expert
witness-an economist-in antitrust case); Molly Selvin & Larry Picus, The Debate
over Jury Performance: Observations from a Recent Asbestos Case 27 (1987) (con-
cluding that "jurors [in an asbestos case] were ... generally skeptical if not negatively
disposed toward many of the medical experts who testified"); Vidmar & Schuller,
Juries and Expert Evidence, supra note 8, at 171 ("One of the most striking findings
from these interviews [of jurors in medical malpractice cases] is the skepticism that
jurors displayed toward experts.").
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part because they believed that "experts are chosen to testify
because their opinions favor the party that calls them."' But
while in the civil context the view of experts as hired guns is ap-
plied against both parties, since both are paying for their expert
testimony, in the criminal context, this skepticism of experts as
hired guns appears to work most harshly against the defendant
as the party most clearly "paying" for the expert testimony.
The bias against defense experts as "professional witnesses"
may also be explained by the fact, as developed in the next Sec-
tion, that the prosecution expert's testimony is more likely to be
in accord with the jurors' preconceptions of human behavior.
Consequently, to the extent the defense experts are testifying to
matters that do not sound "right" to the juror, the testimony
may simply reinforce the juror's predisposition to believe that
the defense experts are only saying such things because they are
being paid.
2. Jurors as Skeptics
Juror skepticism of expert testimony arises from several
sources. First, jurors may find a particular expert untrustworthy
or not credible. Not surprisingly, given that jurors already har-
bor a suspicion that most experts are hired guns, jurors tend to
seize upon any perceived weaknesses in an expert's testimony.
One suspects that it is not coincidental that in describing experts
whom they saw as falling apart on cross-examination, the jurors'
word choice conveyed an unusually zestful delight laden with
vivisectionist terminology: defense experts were variously "picked
apart," (FD,); "ripped... to threads," (F12D4); "chopped up,"
(M5L6); "chewed up," (M6D7); "blow[n] ... out of the box," (MD,);"cut down to size," (FL,); and had "their balls cut off-[the
prosecutor] sent them off bleeding," (M7D4).
Specific shortcomings cited by the jurors focused on creden-
tials, manner, and preparation. Sounding a bit like a tenure re-
view committee, jurors unfavorably took note of matters such as
the "last time [the expert] had written anything was fifteen years
ago," (M.D.), or that the expert "got [his] Ph.D. from [a] mail
Vidmar & Schuller, Juries and Expert Evidence, supra note 8, at 171.
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order college," (F,3D2). 8 Some comments indicated that the ex-
pert had not communicated well with the jury, having come
across as a "self-centered egotist," (M9D3), or as "foggy and un-
clear and just pompous," (M3D6). In one case, an expert witness
who testified at the guilt phase about the defendant's mental
impairment was seen as having impressive credentials, but her
testimony was hampered by poor communication skills:
This was one of her first trials and it was obvious. The D.A. did
a good job of chewing her up.... I didn't find a lot of her tes-
timony to be credible. She tried to make, I think, things that
are not proven.., as fact. Not that she was a social scientist,
although she had a background, like she had every possible de-
gree. But I did not, you know, I believed some of the things
she said, but I didn't find her exceptionally believable.... She
was not a skilled witness. Even the judge showed some, you
know, some doubt.... [S]he would answer something and we'd
just, you know, I would roll my eyes and I would see [the judge]
rolling his eyes.... [Her testimony] took so long. (ML 6).
The most frequent comments, however, picked up on per-
ceived failures in preparation or on actions that the jurors saw
as confirming their suspicions of experts as "professional wit-
nesses." In one case, for instance, the defense psychologist
stated on cross-examination that he had destroyed his record-
ings of interviews and his original notes. This struck the jury as
incredible and led the jury to conclude that the "psychological
expert guy kind of shot himself in the foot.... He was the guy
who burned his tapes or otherwise disposed of the hard raw data
from his interviews." (M,0L5). More common was skepticism
about how the expert could spend a small amount of time with
the defendant and then testify authoritatively: "One of the psy-
chologists had spent only two hours with [the] defendant and
came up with this thick report and in-depth diagnosis. So the
jury didn't give her much credibility." (F,4L7).59 The juror in that
m The expert's credentials, or more accurately lack thereof, apparently were high-
lighted, as another juror in the same case noted, "He had very dubious credentials."
She described the school he attended as a "store-front type." (F4D,).
5, A juror in a different case who stated that "[t]he worst witness ... for the de-
fense ... was the psychiatrist," was particularly upset that the psychiatrist had not
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case was particularly struck by the fact that the prosecution's
psychologist had spent more time evaluating the defendant than
the defendant's own expert. In another case, even a juror whose
comments evinced an understanding of the role of professional
experts and the demands of their schedules was given pause by
the defense psychiatrist's lateness in performing his evaluation:
[O]ne of the things the prosecuting attorney asked was, "When
did you talk to the family, when did you talk to the defendant?"
Well he had talked to the defendant two days earlier, and he
talked to the members of the family yesterday. The prosecut-
ing attorney goes, "Yesterday!" ... I thought it was quite hu-
morous. Sure it would be ideal if the psychiatrist had been
talking earlier in the case, but people are busy, people have
schedules. [But], urn, you know it seems a little odd that they
were talking only several days before. I mean, this was a life
and death matter. I mean, I was sort of like, geez. (F,,D3).
A second source of skepticism transcends particular witnesses
and encompasses a generalized suspicion of experts. Experts
are often seen as "not in touch with reality," (M8D,), and "hard
to believe," (F16D6).' Intriguingly, the label "expert" to which so
many people aspire was considered by some jurors to be almost
a pejorative term. One juror, for instance, savaged a psychia-
trist:
They're the dumbest people in the world when it comes to sub-
stance [abuse] and knowledge of it. They're worse than doctors
and they're the dumbest ones.... [Lawyers] bring in expert wit-
nesses, they're not experts. They're just human beings and they
get labeled this way and they're so ridiculous, you know.... I
don't know where they come up with the expert witnesses.
(MIL).
spent as much time interviewing the defendant and the defendant's family as he had
first claimed:
[A] lot of his testimony proved to be false under cross examination.... He said
that he spent X amount of hours with [the defendant]. That proved to be false.
The whole testimony just proved to be so false that later, you couldn't believe
anything he said. Also he talked about questioning [the defendant's] family,
spending time with his family-that proved to be false. (F,,D3).
10 Cf. Rita James Simon, The Jury and the Defense of Insanity 163-65 (1967) (finding
jurors in simulated experiment viewed psychiatric testimony with skepticism).
The Jury as Critic
In contrast, the same juror was very impressed with a psy-
chologist "who had done more practical work with people."
Tellingly, in the juror's mind, the psychologist was more impres-
sive precisely because she was not presented as an expert: "Any-
way, this guy, this psychiatrist was labeled as an expert witness.
The psychologist was just brought in as a witness. She was not
considered an expert."
Moreover, the experts' theories are often seen as Trojan horses
against which the jury must be on guard. Jurors frequently re-
sponded to the interviewer's questions about whether a particular
defense was raised with answers such as, "they tried that.., they
tried to pull that," (M,2Dg), or "[t]he defense kept trying to tell
us that," (M13L6). One juror, in response to an anthropologist's
testimony that the defendant's ethnic background made him
prone to violence when he discovered that someone else had fa-
thered his daughter, exclaimed, "Give me a break! Like we're
supposed to believe it was just one of those macho things."
(MAD) . 1
The potential for jurors to react in a hostile fashion to what
most lawyers and academics accept as valid expert testimony can
be seen in one jury's reaction to an eyewitness identification ex-
pert who testified at the guilt phase." The jury found the testi-
mony "insulting," because in testifying about how people mis-
perceive events, the expert "obviously... was talking about us....
I mean it was a real tricky thing. I don't think they should have
done it." (FH,). A different juror called the expert a "charlatan"
because the expert had said that "you can't trust your own per-
ceptions." (F,H,). She further explained:
61 The fear of being tricked can also be seen in a juror's comments based on her
participation on a jury where the defense psychiatrist told the jury that the defendant
had the emotional development of a twelve-year-old and the jury imposed a life
sentence as a result. After sentencing, the defendant was quoted in a newspaper and,
much to the juror's dismay, "He came out in the paper not sounding like an
emotional twelve-year-old at all." (F,7L). t
62 The research establishing the potential unreliability of eyewitness testimony is
now quite large and persuasive. See Michael J. Saks & Reid Hastie, Social Psychology
in Court 191 (1978) (describing the "vast number of threats to the accuracy and
completeness" of eyewitness accounts); see generally id. at 167-91 (reviewing studies
and encouraging the use of expert testimony to explain to the jury the potential
problems with eyewitness testimony).
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There was a little bit of talk about how we felt manipulated by
the defense attorneys because of their so-called expert. We felt
that they were, it was a manipulation-type thing. It was not
truly casting doubt. They tried and failed to cast doubt on the
[store] clerk [witness] by having this guy say you can't trust
yourself to identify anybody. And so, because of that, because
they failed so miserably, and it was such a miserable thing, sev-
eral of us felt manipulated by them and didn't believe them
much.... That one was an incredible, blatant stupidity on their
part.63
This strong negative reaction to the expert's testimony on
eyewitness reliability, which was targeted at discrediting wit-
nesses' identifications of the defendant, but which the jury took
more broadly as suggesting that people (i.e., the jurors them-
selves) cannot trust their own perceptions, becomes even more
understandable when one identifies a third source of jury skep-
ticism-the jurors' own personal experiences and theories of
human behavior.' Professors Bonnie and Slobogin have sug-
gested that the prosecution has a significant advantage when the
defendant is claiming the existence of a behavioral abnormality,
because "[t]he factfinder is likely to view with considerable
skepticism the defendant's claim that he did not function as
would a normal person under the circumstances."'65
6The jury's reaction may not be that surprising given the research that has
indicated that laypersons' perceptions of eyewitness reliability vary substantially from
those of experts. See Kenneth A. Deffenbacher & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Do Jurors
Share a Common Understanding Concerning Eyewitness Behavior?, 6 Law & Hum.
Behav. 15, 17, 24 (1982); A. Daniel Yarmey & Hazel P. Tressillian Jones, Is the
Psychology of Eyewitness Identification a Matter of Common Sense?, in Evaluating
Witness Evidence 13 (Sally M.A. Lloyd-Bostock & Brian R. Clifford eds., 1983).
Other research, however, has indicated that expert testimony on eyewitness identifi-
cation, especially if tailored to the specific issues in the case, can increase the likeli-
hood of a more favorable verdict for the defendant. See Vidmar & Schuller, Juries
and Expert Evidence, supra note 8, at 160-66 (reviewing mock jury studies on eye-
witness expert testimony).
"Victor Gold, Covert Advocacy: Reflections on the Use of Psychological Persua-
sion Techniques in the Courtroom, 65 N.C. L. Rev. 481, 492 (1987) ("To psycho-
logists... the unbiased juror does not exist. Jurors, like all other human decision-
makers, cannot evaluate evidence as if it were sui generis but must always relate it to
past experiences and preconceived beliefs about the world: the knowledge structures
they have accumulated over a lifetime." (footnote omitted)).
6Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 6, at 477.
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If anything, Bonnie and Slobogin may have underestimated
the extent of the prosecution's advantage. In part this is be-
cause many jurors had doubts whether factors usually thought
of as mitigating really do excuse behavior. This was true whether
the factor was drug abuse," intoxication,67 a bad childhood," or
even severe mental illness. 9 One juror captured the reluctance
of many to view such factors as mitigating:
They tried to play it off at the trial though that [he] had such a
bad childhood. His father was a bad influence, and his mother
didn't fill in the gaps and all this. When it gets down to the bot-
tom line, when you get [to be] nineteen years old you have to
still know right from wrong. I don't care what Mommy did or
Daddy didn't do and all this. You still know right from wrong.
You may have some anger and bitterness and frustrations and
all that about your life and the way it's been and where it's go-
ing, but does that mean you turn around and mistreat other
people? Especially you sit around and coldly scheme killing
somebody. You don't care who it is; if they're in the way of
you getting that money-what you thought was $5000-that's
tough. Too bad, they got to go. That's the way it came out at
the trial. (M,,L 0).70
6"[B]y the same token, he shouldn't have used drugs in the first place." (F0D,).
67 "People are still responsible for their actions. Just because they are drunk, you
just can't say you had a bad night." (F,,L9).
"[A]t one point I began crying .... [Mie got a raw deal starting off, [but] he had
many, many chances." (FD 10).
6 "He used [mental illness] as a defense-which he had-but [he] still know what
he was doing and that it was wrong." (M,4D,). Whether the defendant knew right
from wrong despite his mental illness clearly would be relevant to an insanity defense
at the guilt phase, but the juror here was rejecting his mental illness even as a miti-
gating factor arguing for a life rather than death sentence. For further discussion of
this case, see infra Section IV.A.
One juror found that the willingness to consider mitigating evidence in her jury
was influenced by gender:
How much weight to give his background was an issue. That one divided
probably a little more on male/female lines, which is, I think, almost is to be
expected.... Most people can come up with some kind of a sob story. Does
that mean that you don't hold people accountable for their actions? And how,
when does that accountability kick in, and when do you say, "Okay, yeah, you
had a rough life but, you know, you're 21 years old now, it's time for you to be
accountable."... So it was just this question of when and to what extent do we
hold people accountable for their behavior? (F L,).
Virginia Law Review
Most jurors' working assumption appeared to be that al-
though the defendant may have had a difficult past, if at some
juncture he had an opportunity to take the "high road" (for ex-
ample, living with a caring aunt or receiving counseling), then by
committing crimes he had in some sense chosen the "low road."
In fact, many juries created time lines for the defendant's life,
sometimes literally drawing them out, in an effort to decipher
how events in the defendant's life had played out: Had he ever
had that opportunity to escape the effects of what everyone would
admit was a horrible childhood? One juror's comments illus-
trate how the free-will notion could trump even emotionally
compelling mitigating evidence:
He had a pretty bad childhood.... The mother blew her brains
out in front of him, he was a very young kid. The mom was a
drug addict.... [S]he would stay up all night and sleep all
day.... So the sister who was just a couple of years older than
he-she did all the cooking, she did all the cleaning. And I re-
member at one point I began crying because I had two little
kids and I just, it just tore my heart out that the sister made his
lunches, his first day at kindergarten, his sister, just two years
older, took him to school and stood in line for him to get into
kindergarten. It just tore me up. I just thought he got a raw
deal starting off. [But h]e had many, many chances, okay, he
chose this road because he had his own business, he had a nice
wife... and he chose to take that path. (F,,D,0).
The prosecutorial advantage, however, is sometimes powered
by more than just the presumption in favor of personal respon-
sibility that many jurors bring to the jury deliberations. While
one would expect some jurors to bring an expertise into the jury
room based upon their work or training,7 a surprising number
71 In one case, for instance, one of the jurors was a doctor who became something of
an ombudsman for the other jurors in understanding testimony regarding drug use:
"[W]e listened to some testimony over again. It... was one of the psychologists or
psychiatrists about [the defendant's drug use]. We didn't understand a lot, and we
had a doctor. It was helpful to have intelligent people because they could translate
some of these things to us." (F,,D7). In another case, a highway patrol officer
effectively quashed the doubts of some jurors concerning ballistics testimony: "Well,
it's funny, the women disagreed with the ballistics. They couldn't see how that could
prove itself. We had a highway patrolman, [he] was the chairman of the jury and he
said there was no doubt about it." (M 6H1). Similar functions were served in other
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of jurors or their close relatives had been involved with or had
been a victim of the same mitigating circumstances being put
forward by the defendant for excusing his behavior. The reac-
tion of these jurors, by and large, as they listened to an expert
tell about the defendant's hardships, was "Yeah, well, I went
through that and I didn't end up a killer." Thus, the jurors
themselves sometimes became self-appointed experts, offering
themselves or family members as Exhibit A as to why an alleg-
edly mitigating factor was not valid:
Juror: [The expert] talked about methamphetamines and that
they can make you not aware of your doings and such.... I
thought it was a crock, because when I was in college ... I did
this stuff....
Interviewer: Have you used methamphetamines?
Juror: Yeah, yeah so when I was sitting there listening to this
drug expert I was thinking, "Have you ever done this stuff?"
Do you actually know what was, I mean, is this all just textbook
knowledge? Because he knew nothing.... I had done this
stuff, I know, and everything he was saying was just so far-
fetched. I wondered where he got all this from.
Interviewer: Did you share that with the jury?
Juror: Oh yeah. Because there was another girl in there too,
she was a former addict and.., a recovering alcoholic, and she
told the jury too, "I've done this stuff .... " We both told the
jury, "I've used it, I've done it, and I would no more go out and
say, 'Let's go kill somebody today and let's get cash and get
more drugs."' I never was up for four or five or six days as he
apparently was. Even so, when you do the drugs you know it's
illegal, you know it's wrong, so I just believe you're responsible
for your actions. (F=D10).'
Intriguingly, when asked on voir dire if she had ever used drugs,
the juror had openly discussed her drug use, including what
kinds of drugs she had used. One suspects that the defense at-
torney, upon hearing the juror's voir dire responses, thought
cases by a probation officer, (F L1 0), a correctional officer, (M,,L,,), and a social worker,
(F.L,).
1 In a different case, another juror explained how she had convinced the other
jurors not to excuse the defendant because she, the juror, also had "been through the




that she was getting someone on the jury who would empathize
with the defendant's drug problem. Instead, the attorney ended
up with the defendant's harshest critic during deliberations.
Similarly, a juror in a different case, when asked, "Did the de-
fendant remind you of someone?," responded, "Myself," and
then talked about how, like the defendant, his own upbringing
was marked by great adversity. (MA8D8). Again, though, instead
of making the juror empathetic to the defendant's plight, his re-
action to the defendant's situation was one of anger: "[I was
m]ad because of the choices the defendant had made. He did
have a choice to do the things he did," (M,,D,)-just as the juror
had made his own choices.
Finally, although not a frequent subject of comment, some ju-
rors cited the conflicting testimony of the defense and prosecu-
tion's experts as creating skepticism about all of the expert tes-
timony: "[The expert witnesses] were just on opposite sides and
opposite opinions." (M2L,).73 These jurors resolved the "battle
of the experts" by viewing the experts as "cancel[ing] each other
out," (F L,), and making it "a little easier to discount them both,"
(M,gL, 0). In one case, for instance, the defense presented expert
testimony that the defendant's brain was dysfunctional, a propo-
sition rebutted by a prosecution expert. Because the "testi-
monies conflicted," the juror explained that she simply threw
out the testimony of both experts and proceeded to make her
decision on what she "thought was reasonable." (F,D .)"
A juror in a different case, struggling with whether to excuse the defendant
because of the effects of drug use, used the conflicting expert testimony as a partial
justification for deciding the issue against the defendant: "I find it hard to believe
that he was so much under the influence of drugs that he didn't know what he was
doing. Even when you get experts together, they don't always agree either." (F20D,).
At least where psychiatric evaluation of the defendant is involved, conflicting expert
testimony is almost inevitable given the wide range of theoretical views and the
realities of the adversarial system. See Saks & Hastie, supra note 62, at 147-48.
74The tendency of jurors faced with a "battle of the experts" to treat experts' con-
flicting testimony as canceling each other out has been noted in other research. See
Jane Goodman et al., What Confuses Jurors in Complex Cases, Trial, Nov. 1985, at 65,
68 (finding that juries may resolve "battle" by finding that "conflicting experts ...
cancel each other's influence"); Vidmar & Schuller, Juries and Expert Evidence, supra
note 8, at 159-60 (discussing Nancy Brekke, Expert Scientific Testimony in Rape Trials
27,31-32 (1985) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota)).
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In sum, experts' explanations of human behavior that run
contrary to notions of free will are hard to sell to the jury. 5 Ju-
rors drew heavily upon their own experiences and outlooks on
personal responsibility and concluded that most experts were
looking at the world through the perspective of a textbook
rather than that of real life. Not unexpectedly, this skepticism
about clinical testimony had the greatest impact on the defense
experts, because they were the ones generally espousing theo-
ries in conflict with the jurors' notions of human behavior and
responsibility. The prosecution's experts, on the other hand,
were called as witnesses precisely because they believed the de-
fendant should not be excused for his behavior.76 Their testi-
mony, therefore, was far more likely to paint a worldview in ac-
cord with the beliefs that the jurors brought into the jury box at
the start of the trial,' beliefs that tended toward Old Testament
fire and brimstone.
3. Playing a Discordant Tune: The Failure to Tie Up
What becomes evident after reviewing the jurors' comments is
that trial attorneys must be acutely aware that juries are strongly
disinclined to accept an expert witness's theory or analysis sim-
ply because the testimony is coming from an expert. The expert
who believes that her testimony will be revered by the jury based
71 Professor Michael Perlin refers to juror skepticism of mental disability defenses as
"sanism," an irrational bias against and fear of the mentally ill. Michael L. Perlin,
The Sanist Lives of Jurors in Death Penalty Cases: The Puzzling Role of "Mitigating"
Mental Disability Evidence, 8 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 239, 240-41
(1994). Professor Haney has argued that it is both psychologically and legally falla-
cious to justify a death sentence on the grounds that not everybody who experiences
the defendant's mitigating circumstances (e.g., child abuse and drug dependency) ends
up a killer. Haney, supra note 31, at 600-02; see id. at 601-02 (the "not everybody"
argument fails to account for how factors interact and for individualized responses).
76 Professor Ken Nunn has argued that the prosecution has the advantage of being
perceived as the repository of the moral sense throughout the criminal trial. Kenneth
B. Nunn, The Trial as Text: Allegory, Myth and Symbol in the Adversarial Criminal
Process-A Critique of the Role of the Public Defender and a Proposal for Reform,
32 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 743, 786-88 (1995).
" In some cases, this tendency may cause jurors to give a prosecution expert's testi-
mony too much weight, given the limits of psychiatric expertise. See Showalter &
Bonnie, supra note 41, at 165 (cautioning that because juries are already likely to
believe a defendant poses a future danger, they will tend to overvalue expert predic-
tions that confirm such beliefs).
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upon the dazzle of her credentials, the glitter of her academic
appointments, and the sophistication of her analysis would be in
for a rude shock if she could hear the jury deliberate. As was
suggested earlier, it is helpful for the attorney to think of the
presentation of a capital case, especially at the penalty phase, as
comparable to composing a musical score with each type of wit-
ness-professional expert, lay expert, and family witness-
making a contribution to the orchestration. To extend the sym-
phony analogy further, if an expert plays a solo that does not
seem to relate to the other evidence and witnesses, the jury is
far more likely to tune the expert out rather than defer to her
purported expertise.78
Sometimes the expert's failure to blend into the overall or-
chestration was due to causes as shockingly simple as not dem-
onstrating that her testimony applied to the defendant's situation.
In one case, a juror at first favorably noted that the defense psy-
chiatrist was "educational. [We] learned a lot about crack," but
then proceeded to classify that very same testimony as backfir-
ing because there was no evidence presented at the trial that the
defendant had been using crack at the time of the offense.
Thus, the juror concluded, the expert's testimony was a "futile
effort, [and] the prosecutor picked up on it." (MD,,). 79
More often, the testimony failed because it was presented in
an evidentiary vacuum and did not strike the jurors as revealing
particularly helpful information about this defendant. For ex-
79 Ron Allen and Joseph Miller have done much to articulate the concern that
jurors will defer to experts rather than using the expert testimony to enhance the
rationality of their decision. See Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The Common
Law Theory of Experts: Deference or Education?, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1131, 1131
(1993) (arguing that the key to resolving the debate over experts is answering the
"deeper question.., whether fact finders are to be educated by or to defer to experts");
Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The Expert as Educator: Enhancing the Ration-
ality of Verdicts in Child Sex Abuse Prosecutions, 1 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 323, 335
(1995) (arguing that courts should show "proper concern for guaranteeing that an
expert assist, rather than supplant, the jury in comprehending the evidence presented").
The Project's findings suggest that placing experts in an assisting rather than sup-
planting role not only may be a good evidentiary policy, but a wise tactical use of
expert testimony as well.
79 Remarkably, a similar failure occurred in a different case, with the juror noting that
the "psychologist talked about how he may have done [the killing] under the influence
but this was never mentioned at [the] guilt phase. No proof of this at all." (M2,D8).
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ample, in one case, a psychiatrist described the defendant's
tragic loss of his brother and how it traumatized the defendant
at the time. But, according to the jurors, neither the expert nor
the defense attorney then made an effort to weave the event
into other aspects of the defendant's life story. Consequently,
the jury did not know how to make use of it in assessing the de-
fendant's actions.
Juror: I think they were trying to paint a picture of getting
our sympathy for this defendant because he had this traumatic
experience in his life. But it was sort of like, okay, well, what
do we do with that? It was very hard.., hard for us to hear
that. All the other jurors had great empathy for this thirteen-
year-old boy who lost his brother, and we had a lot of feeling
for it, but we didn't know what to do with it! ...
Interviewer: So you would say the other jurors did feel em-
pathy for the brother's death, but they didn't know where to go
with it?
Juror: Very much. It wasn't enough to make sense. Like if
we could somehow tie it in, and say it was so damaging psy-
chologically, you know, in some way make us realize that that
could permanently affect a person.
Interviewer: So he basically testified as to the trauma of the
incident, but not as to what was ongoing? And did the defense
attorney take that thread?
Juror: No, it ended.
Interviewer: So basically you ended up with this traumatic
experience that everybody agreed was traumatic ....
Juror: And then the rest [of the jurors] kind of just disre-
garded it because, you know, "So what?" You know that's real
sad, but it wasn't enough to erase this long string of crime. You
couldn't make sense of why, why wasn't he able to overcome
that. You had a traumatic experience, you know, you lost a
baby when your wife had a miscarriage, you know it didn't ruin
you life. So why, how come he didn't get over it? (F 1D3).
Another juror in the same case had a similar reaction, describ-
ing the psychiatrist's testimony as actually "hurt[ing]" the de-
fendant's case in mitigation because, without further context
and given his other crimes, "I was asking myself, you are crazy
to blame his past.... As a justification for his lifestyle, just for-
get it." (M2D 3).
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Similarly, while juries frequently find individualized evidence
to be very powerful as to why the defendant in their case will
adapt well to prison life and not pose a danger,' general evidence
presented by "prison experts" was often seen as irrelevant and
even harmful to the defendant's case."l After hearing general
testimony concerning prison life, the jurors' usual reactions
were not that incarceration was severe punishment, but that "it's
a pretty good life." (F26D,2).' A prison warden called by the de-
fense as a prison expert, for example, was seen as backfiring
"because he painted a picture of a pretty decent life in prison.
We were like, 'Wait a minute."' (MD,).83 Tellingly, one juror
first remembered a prison expert as a prosecution witness be-
fore later remembering that the expert was a defense witness
whose testimony, in her view, backfired:
Well, I thought, for the prosecution, I thought that the prison
expert was pretty good.... But I can't remember if the prison
expert was brought in by the defense or prosecution. It could've
been the defense [the juror later remembered he was a defense
expert]. He was saying, he was showing pictures of what the
prison looked like and what the daily routine is and that was
the only time that [the defendant] really looked interested in
what was going on. He just kind of brightened up at the pros-
pect of being able to have a TV in his room and having a job in
the prison and the exercise yard and he looked pretty happy.
That was very interesting to him. That was the only time I ever
saw him show any interest in the whole proceeding. And I
think it was supposed to show the jurors that life in prison was
10 See infra notes 91-92 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying note 93.
81 One study on how decisionmakers use statistical evidence in predicting the likeli-
hood of recidivism similarly found that the more explicitly the evidence was associ-
ated with the individual whose behavior was being predicted, the more likely the
decisionmaker was to rely upon it. John S. Carroll, Judgments of Recidivism Risk:
The Use of Base-Rate Information in Parole Decisions, in New Directions in Psycho-
legal Research 68, 82 (Paul D. Lipsitt & Bruce Dennis Sales eds., 1980).
A predisposition to come to this conclusion might be seen in the juror's comments
leading up to the above-quoted statement: "I think they have amenities available,
they have access to law books, they have access to the telephone. They do have very
limited freedoms.... They do have to be chained every time they leave, but it's a pretty
good life." (FzD,,) (emphasis added).
3 Another juror in the case used almost the same words to describe the testimony's
effect: "[The p]rison official's testimony backfired because he painted too lenient of a
picture of life in prison." (F27D,).
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going to be a miserable existence, but to me it didn't seem like
it was bad enough for what he had done .... (F3L3). 4
In another case, a juror recalled the prison expert testifying
that the defendant "could be a doughnut maker," which made
the juror think the testimony "was a crock-why should he be
allowed to make doughnuts for the rest of his life when he has
murdered somebody?" (FD,,0)."
Most damaging of all is when the expert's testimony not only
stands apart from the other mitigating evidence or defenses but
actually creates conflicts within the evidence. Although un-
usual, a vivid example occurred in a case where the defense first
put on evidence that the defendant wrote poetry as a means of
showing that he was a model prisoner. The defense then called
a neurologist who testified that the defendant had neurological
damage that might impair his ability to tell the difference be-
tween right and wrong. The prosecutor, at least from the jury's
perspective and to their fascination,' was able to use the poetry
evidence to impeach the neurologist's testimony, because the
area of the brain used to determine right from wrong was the
same area that allowed the defendant to write poetry.'
8 4 The juror did note that "many of the other jurors disagreed" with her that prison
life would be too plush. (F3L).
The importance of choosing one's examples carefully also can be seen in one
attorney's closing argument at the penalty phase where, according to one juror:
The defense attorney said some stupid things [in arguing that life imprisonment
was sufficient punishment]; the fact that [the defendant] would never be able to
have barbecues again. I mean he went into so much stupid detail, "[The
defendant] will never be able to have Grey Poupon again." I mean really stupid!
(Laughs) Every time I see a commercial [for it], I think of this. (FD,2).
One juror described the expert as "from a well-known hospital ... [who] was
supposed to be one of the country's foremost [experts]." From this juror's viewpoint,
however, the expert "totally blew it," leading the juror to rather colorfully note that
the prosecutor had the expert "by the balls and he squeezed." (M,D 4).
The juror commented:
They tried to say that psychologically he had a problem differentiating the
difference between right and wrong in certain situations. And that side of the
brain that makes these decisions, you could never write poetry.... The experts,
they totally blew it. This told us that all of their reasoning that he had a mental
problem in making his decision between right and wrong under certain circum-
stances, it was repudiated because this guy wrote poetry. (MD,).
This juror may have been especially delighted that the poetry evidence backfired
against the expert, because he had been less than impressed that the defendant wrote
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More typically, the defense may not even be aware that they
have created a conflict that will play itself out in the jury room.
In a case that involved what normally would be thought of as
compelling mitigating evidence-the defendant suffered from a
severe mental illness-the defense's understandable effort to
document the defendant's psychiatric history raised a different
concern with the jury. A psychiatrist explained that the defen-
dant's violent behavior could be attributed to his mental illness
when he did not take his medication. But while this fact provided
a mitigating explanation for the defendant's behavior, it also cre-
ated a "fear that he would be released and kill again or kill some-
one in prison." (F D5). Consequently, although satisfied that the
defendant "was very, very ill," ultimately "what we decided was
that regardless of his illness, if he was a danger to society, then the
only solution would be the capital punishment," (F29D,).'
As with the other concerns jurors raised about experts, these
juror reactions do not mean that experts cannot play an impor-
tant and effective role. What they do emphasize, though, is the
risk of having the expert play a leading rather than supporting
role in developing the defense's case. If the expert performs as
a soloist, presenting theories unsupported by facts established
by more credible witnesses who are free of the suspicions at-
tached to experts, the testimony is likely to be discounted at best
or have a negative spillover effect at worse. If, on the other
hand, the expert takes the role of accompanist and helps har-
moniously explain, integrate, and provide context to evidence
presented by others, the jury is far more likely to find the ex-
pert's testimony useful and reliable. And, as the jurors' com-
ments make evident, the testimony most likely to be trusted is
that coming from lay experts.
poetry. Serving the role of self-appointed expert, see supra note 72 and accom-
panying text, the juror stated that "most people in prison [write poetry]. My wife was
in jail for five years. They're all very artistic and poetic because they've got nothing
else to do. They get profound when they've got a lot of time to think." (MD 4).
81 Although in California the only statutory alternative to the death penalty is life
without parole, juries often were still very concerned with the defendant's future
dangerousness because of uncertainty over the defendant's potential actions while in
prison as well as a general skepticism as to whether life without parole really meant
the defendant would never be released. See infra note 119.
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B. Jurors' Perceptions of Lay Experts
Once it is understood why juries often distrust professional
experts, it is not difficult to fathom why, by comparison, juries
find lay experts credible: They bring to the witness stand almost
the exact opposite attributes of the professional expert. They
generally are not being paid for their testimony, so they are not
susceptible to the label of "hired gun." Their testimony derives
from their own experiences and often from their direct interac-
tion with the defendant. As a result, their testimony is not based
on a two-hour interview with the defendant in preparation for
trial, but carries the power and truth of personal observation.
Finally, because the testimony is grounded in facts relevant to
this defendant and this case, their observations will be seen by
the jury as relevant and helpful in understanding the defen-
dant's actions. 9
One case in particular highlights the jury's contrasting views
of professional and lay experts. The interviewed jurors roundly
condemned the defense expert, a clinical psychologist, as em-
bodying all of the negative traits associated with professional
experts-he had destroyed his original notes, had billed the tax-
payers $48,000, and to add insult to injury was seen as not being
particularly insightful (one juror called him a "total bozo," adding
that "since he was hired by the defense.., it just made [the de-
fense counsel] look foolish" (FL,)). On the other hand, the ju-
rors spoke with great admiration of another defense witness, a
woman who knew the defendant growing up, who had engaged
in many of the same destructive behaviors as the defendant's
mother, and who had turned herself around and now was a cler-
gywoman running a rehabilitation center. One juror kept a
journal and her entry describing the witness's impact conveys
almost a sense of reverence:
81 See Geimer, supra note 42, at 293 ("Lay witnesses can powerfully communicate
impairment."); Deana Dorman Logan, Is it Mitigation or Aggravation?: Trouble-
some Areas of Defense Evidence in Capital Sentencing, Cal. Att'ys for Crim. Just. F.,
Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 14, 18 ("Counsel should carefully prepare witnesses to tell their
stories through anecdotes and specific acts rather than through generalizations and
the use of character or reputation evidence. Such anecdotes not only make the testi-




Several witnesses.., really clinched my decision [for life]. One
woman took the stand and stated that her current line of work
is director for a facility of [a rehabilitation center] for recover-
ing substance abusers. She was very articulate and intelligent,
and nicely dressed. What surprised all of us was that she used
to be a hooker, a junkie and a drug dealer, and was a close
friend of [the defendant's] mother.... A few years ago she be-
came a Christian, turned her life around, and is now successful.
Two of her three children also became Christians and followed
in their mother's footsteps. One son is still doing a prison sen-
tence. As she pointed out, all children want to emulate their
parents, whether they're doctors, lawyers, etc. or pushers and
pimps. All a child knows is that if their parent does it, then
they must follow suit. Her children followed her into drugs and
crime just as [the defendant] followed his mother and her boy-
friend. He didn't know any other way. Then when this woman
turned around and gave them something good and positive to
emulate, they followed her into the brighter side of life. I ad-
mired her for all the above reasons, but also because she re-
mained calm and cool and spoke with such a sureness and
strength about her. (FL5).
The witness thus provided context and tied together for the
jury the evidence that they had previously heard concerning the
defendant's rough childhood, while also giving them reason to
believe that he might still achieve some goodness in life. As the
juror noted during her interview,
He didn't know any other way. I mean that doesn't make it
right, and we weren't, none of us on the jury thought that it was
right. But, it was just, you know, this poor kid. He didn't grow
up like I did.... What impressed me was that she used to be at
rock bottom yet she picked herself up and turned her life
around. So, just because she came from a poor background
doesn't mean that she's always, or anyone who comes from a
poor background, doesn't mean that they have to stay or
they're always going to stay there. (FL5).
And one cannot envy the prosecutor trying to anticipate how to
cross-examine such a witness, someone who is testifying based
upon personal experiences and personal knowledge of the defen-
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dant. ° On the other hand, the same juror noted that the clinical
psychologist was "cut down to size" on cross-examination. (FL5).
While the clergywoman may at first appear unusual in the de-
gree of her effectiveness, jurors cited a number of other lay ex-
perts who swayed their votes. Especially effective were those
witnesses who were perceived to be testifying counter to their
usual inclinations or who would not normally be seen as suppor-
tive of the defendant. For instance, in contrast to general "prison
experts," jurors tended to react favorably to the testimony of
prison employees who had dealt with the defendant and testi-
fied that he would do well in jail. A tendency to find such a wit-
ness credible makes sense, as a prison employee is unlikely to be
seen as "soft" on someone with whom they or fellow prison em-
ployees will have to deal in the future. Indeed, the common as-
sumption based on movie and book depictions, whether true or
not, is that prisoner-prison employee relationships are hostile.
In one case, for example, a nurse at a prison where the defen-
dant had been previously incarcerated made a powerful impres-
sion on a number of the jurors in part because her testimony
made clear that she did not have a bleeding heart:
She is a strong, strong proponent of the death penalty.... But
she did not think the death penalty was appropriate for [the de-
fendant] ... based on her relationship, interviews, knowledge
over the last seven years of what he's like. And that weighed,
you know. Here was a professional who deals with these types
of people all the time, who is pro-death penalty, [and] who
doesn't think he's a good candidate for the death penalty. That
weighed in my mind. (ML 6).91
And, in another case, a juror specifically noted that it was a jail
guard's testimony and not the expert witnesses' testimony that
11 Imagine, for instance, a cross-examination of the just-described defense witness:
"And how do you know that such a family background can affect an individual?"
"Because I was the mother in such a family." "Well how do you know the defendant
was so affected?" "Because I knew his family well when he was growing up." "But
what makes you think he could ever change?" "Because I have transformed myself
through faith and now spend my life helping others do the same." "Oh."
9 1Four of the five jurors interviewed in the case cited the prison nurse as highly
influential, and her testimony was later instrumental in swaying the jurors holding out
for death to agree instead to a life sentence. See infra note 155 and accompanying text.
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persuaded the jury that the defendant really would adjust well
to prison life, a proposition about which the jury originally had
been quite skeptical. (FL 10).2
Similarly, testimony on the defendant's prospects for making
a positive contribution while incarcerated generally was re-
ceived far more warmly when related through a lay witness than
through a professional expert. Contrast, for example, the deri-
sive view of the prison expert who had offered the insight that
the defendant could be productive as a "doughnut maker" while
in prison,93 with a juror's view of lay testimony by prison guards:
[The defendant] was generally a very helpful person. He was a
good influence in the prison, and that was one of the defense's
big points, was to show that he would be a contributor to
prison.... He was seen as a bridge between the races. I per-
ceive that he was helpful to the guards. He was helpful in
keeping order in the prison, and I think he squealed on some-
one who had weapons.... I think he was, in ways, a giving per-
son. (M5L6).
Anticipating and counteracting what might be seen as bias on
the lay expert's part can be particularly critical, as seen in a case
where two prison preachers testified about how the defendant
had become an active member of the prison's religion program.
Although the prosecutor tried to argue that the defendant's
newfound religion was "hogwash [and] poppycock," (M2L,), the
interviewed jurors found the clergymen very persuasive, in part
because they "said they [had] never testified for the defense at
trial before because they had seen too many people find Jesus
right before trial," (M2L 4). As a consequence, the jury found the
ministers to be "very credible," (F2,L4), and accepted the defense's
92 In one of the cases studied, jurors ended up convinced that prison was not a
country club life after they went to the prison as part of the guilt phase so that they
could see where the killing took place (the defendant was an inmate accused of
killing another inmate). Between the prison tour and hearing the testimony at the
guilt stage of numerous inmates for both the prosecution and defense, the jury came
away convinced that a life sentence in prison was not cutting the defendant any slack.
(M26L.3).
93See supra text accompanying note 85.
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argument that the defendant "had found his place in society-
that he could live responsibly in prison if not outside," (FL,).'
Lay experts also can be invaluable in bringing facts to life that
otherwise might not make a full impression on the jury. In one
case, part of the mitigation defense was that the defendant had
been wrongfully incarcerated in an adult prison for a minor crime
he committed while still only a juvenile. Interestingly, the de-
fense presented this incident in part through the testimony of a
judge who had helped secure the defendant's release from the
wrongful detention:
Interviewer: Any other evidence for the defense at this trial
that was ....
Juror: A good reason not to kill anyone? ... A judge. I can't
remember her name. A very flamboyant, articulate judge who
literally, while she was on the stand took over [Judge A's]
courtroom.
Interviewer: What was she testifying about?
Juror: She was one of the judges that upon hearing what had
happened to [the defendant] being incarcerated for stealing a
bicycle at fourteen, was [instrumental] in getting him released
from prison at age twenty-five. He spent ten years in federal
prison for stealing a bicycle and doing a childish prank at some
girl's house that he had this infatuation with. And she literally
took over [Judge A's] courtroom.
Interviewer: How did she impress you?
Juror: She just brought up enough information and we saw
she was sincere, she was very articulate.
Interviewer: And how did it help you? How did it help [the
defendant]?
Juror: She was pressing the fact that [when the defendant
was growing up,] black, [rural,] working-class [families], they
were basically screwed by society. These were the outcast peo-
ple. She did a lot to bring that to life.... [Now] we look at ...
how backwards white society was in regards to the black role.
[But w]here [was] the civil rights movement of Martin Luther
King [when the defendant was a boy]? We didn't really know
what was going on. These people sat out at their farm and
that's about all we knew at that time. And that's exactly what




she presented happened to this man. Up until he spent ten
years for petty theft. And if his next door neighbor had been a
white boy, would he have gotten ten years for stealing a bicy-
cle? No.
Interviewer: Ten years for stealing a bike?
Juror: Yeah. In the full-blown penitentiary. You just can't
comprehend that such a thing would happen. But when this
judge actually was there and was explaining it ....
Interviewer: If she hadn't been there, would you not have
believed it happened?
Juror: Not that I would have doubted it, but she added such,
such-what's the word-when something is so positive it's so
undeniable, it's such.., reality. (M13L6).
The defense was thus able to present forcefully through the
judge-a witness who would be viewed as both credible and im-
partial-the fact of the defendant's youthful imprisonment and
its injustice. The jury found this evidence highly persuasive in
helping to establish the defendant's overall mitigation theme that
the defendant had been victimized by factors beyond his control.
It is unlikely that a professional expert's testimony about the gen-
eral effects of improper incarceration on a juvenile defendant
would have had the same effect. After all, here was a judge de-
tailing how the very system that she helps run failed this defen-
dant as a child simply because he was young, poor, and black.
This is not to say that lay expert testimony is always uncritically
accepted by juries. The testimony still must prove to be credible
and consistent with the mitigation theme or it may backfire. Nor-
mally, for example, a defense attorney might assume that calling
sheriff's deputies to establish that the defendant was made a
"trusty" of the jail would make a positive impression on the jury.
But where the jury had already heard about the defendant's vio-
lent past, the prosecution was able to turn the testimony against
the defendant by using it to establish that the defendant was
ruthless: "On cross-exam, [the deputies] were asked what the
criteria was in order for an inmate to be a trusty-they testified
he had to be an individual who absolutely could not be intimi-
dated by anyone, [this] showed what kind of person [the defen-
dant] was." (M24D13). Instead of establishing that the defendant
had the potential to make constructive contributions to prison
society if incarcerated for life, the evidence confirmed in the jury's
1150 [Vol. 83:1109
The Jury as Critic
mind that the defendant was someone who would do whatever
was necessary to further his own self-interests.
As a general rule, however, it was the lay experts-the teacher,
the prison guard, the Marine colonel-whom the jurors remem-
bered in detail as being credible and helping them understand
the context of the defendant's background and character. Be-
cause these witnesses were testifying from personal experience
and knowledge, the prosecutor effectively was denied cross-
examination (unless the witness had not told the "full story" on
direct examination, in which case the less flattering facts brought
out on cross-examination could be highly damaging). 95 Moreo-
ver, because the lay witness was drawing upon her own unique
background, the prosecution was unable to neutralize her testi-
mony by calling a rebuttal witness and creating a "battle of the
experts" as is frequently done to counter professional experts
who testify for the defense. Consequently, although they are
the most difficult type of defense witness to locate, knowledge-
able lay experts created relatively risk-free opportunities for the
jury to see the defendant favorably through the eyes of a credi-
ble witness who could provide real-life punctuation to the de-
fense's mitigation story.
C. Jurors' Perceptions of "Family and Friends" Testimony
"The mother had the mother role." (F29D,).
The obvious credibility problem with family and friends wit-
nesses is their inherent bias in favor of the defendant. As would
be expected, jurors frequently noted that such testimony was
predictable: "I knew that his family and friends were going to
9 In one case, the defense called a homeowner who had written a letter to the
defendant's prison warden during an earlier incarceration in a "fire-fighting camp."
The letter praised the defendant for helping as part of a prison work crew to save the
homeowner's house from a fire. On cross-examination, however, it came out that the
defendant had asked the homeowner to write the letter. For the juror, the fact that
the defendant "had 'fished' for the letter" backfired, because it further painted the
defendant as a manipulator. It also was very damaging that a corrections officer from
the fire-fighting camp-the incarceration experience that the defense was trying to
use to establish that the defendant worked well in prison-testified that the defend-
ant had caused trouble at the camp and had to be removed. (MD,).
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say what a wonderful guy he was." (F3L3). Yet, despite the pre-
dictability of such testimony, jurors rarely held it against a de-
fendant; to the contrary, they frequently identified family wit-
nesses as among the most favorable defense witnesses. Indeed,
probably because such testimony is expected, it was the absence
of such testimony that was unfavorably noted: "After it was all
over, I asked [the defense attorney], I said, 'Couldn't you find in
this man's life one person as a character witness?' (FD 14)."
A review of jurors' statements regarding family and friends
testimony reveals both an emotional and a factual component to
its effectiveness. At the most basic level, from an emotional
viewpoint, the testimony shows that someone cares about the
defendant and believes that he has some redeeming value.
Interviewer: Is there anything about this case that sticks in
your mind, or that you keep thinking about?
Juror: During the penalty phase, the public defender brought
a character witness, [someone] who was [the defendant's] legal
guardian at the time he was a child. I remember her because of
her sincerity and the way she was like a mother to [him]. She
really cared about the guy. She just seemed very believable.
[She] was a good character witness for the defense. She was
talking about [his] life, when he was a little kid, and after she
went through that, she was pleading for him not to be given the
death penalty. (MsL,2).
At first, it may seem odd that such a basic point must be made
with the jury. But in a capital case, before the defense presents
its case in mitigation, the jury will have heard evidence that is
overwhelmingly negative: the brutal details of the murder for
which they have convicted the defendant, the defendant's past
history of violent crime, and often testimony from victims of the
defendant's other crimes. The jury is likely to be leaning heav-
9 In another case, the defendant's mother and brother testified, but it was the
father's absence which intrigued the jury. The jury "felt it odd that the father never
came to testify. I think he was ashamed or something because he had a good job and
everything-the father." (F,0D,).
97 Significantly, this statement by the juror was in response to a question very early
in the interview, long before being asked specifically about the trial and various
witnesses. The preliminary questions were designed simply to see, at the start of the
interview, what it was that the juror kept thinking about after the trial.
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ily towards a death sentence,98 and it may be extremely impor-
tant and come as something of a surprise to the jury that the de-
fendant has people who care enough about him to be there on
his behalf. Such testimony may present the first sliver of an in-
sight that there is good in the defendant, as well as evil."
Moreover, listening to a parent or sibling talk about the de-
fendant-how he added to their lives, how they feel responsible
for the way he turned out, how they will feel a loss if he is sen-
tenced to death-almost always has an emotional impact on the
jury. The juror interviews are replete with statements about how
such testimony was "nerve-bending," (M D), and how, as the jury
listened to the testimony, "it got sort of shaky in there," (F3 D,5).
And while some jurors found the emotional reaction hard to
handle ("How can you not feel for the poor woman? I almost
wish they didn't bring her in." (M26L,).),'° they did not appear to
" See Maria Sandys, Cross-Overs-Capital Jurors Who Change Their Minds About
the Punishment: A Litmus Test for Sentencing Guidelines, 70 Ind. LJ. 1183, 1193-95
(1995) (discussing the Project's findings on jurors' leanings prior to penalty phase);
see id. at 1193 ("[A] substantial proportion of the jurors stood ready to make a com-
mitment to vote for death, even before hearing evidence regarding aggravating or
mitigating factors.").
" In one case, the defendant's uncle made a particular impression on a juror mainly
through his constant presence and the fact that he cared about the defendant. The
juror often noticed the uncle in the hall reading a Bible (the uncle was also a pastor)
and at one point saw him crying.
Interviewer: [Of the p]eople the defense called, was there any of those
people, one or two, that stand out as influential in your mind?
Juror: Only the uncle.... He was trying to help his nephew.
Interviewer: And why did he stand out?
Juror: Why did he stand out? Because just being there and trying to help,
like I said, trying to help his nephew.
interviewer: Well, they all were trying to help.
Juror: Yeah.
Interviewer: Or was it because ....
Juror: I think he was there everyday. He really put a lot of himself into this.
Interviewer: So when he testified you felt it was heartfelt because he put so
much of himself into it. Is that fair to say? I don't want to be putting words in
your mouth. I'm just trying to understand.
Juror: That's all I can say about it.
Interviewer: What was he saying?
Juror: What a good fellow he was in his eyes and how his parents brought
him up, which were the grandparents. (F,,],).
,00 Another juror in the same case remarked, "There was a lot of emotional stuff
brought forth. I had enough emotional problems dealing with myself that I didn't
need everyone else's input." (ML 13). It should be noted that although these jurors
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hold it against the defendant. One juror's description of a mother
testifying conveys the potential emotional power of such testi-
mony:
[The mother] was up there, and the defense attorney was tell-
ing her, you know, he said, "Are you aware that your son was
found guilty of first degree murder and robbery?" She said,
"Yes." He goes, "Do you realize we are going through the pen-
alty phase right now [when] we are determining whether.., the
jurors should give him the death penalty or life in prison with-
out the possibility of parole?" And she said, "Yes." Then he
goes, "Do you have anything to say about that?" And she
started crying. I had a big old lump in my throat. She was go-
ing, "Please God protect my child," and I'm going, "Oh God."
You know, it's his mom, you know. (F33L1).
Part of the emotional impact appears to stem from the jurors'
ability to relate to the parent or the sibling in a way that they
simply cannot to the defendant who has committed this horrible
crime."' Moreover, to the extent family members are viewed
sympathetically, it also brings other individuals into the picture
who will be affected by the decision of whether to execute the
defendant. In one case, the distinct turning point in favor of life
was a sister's testimony, testimony that every juror interviewed
characterized as highly influential and emotional. The sister, at
first, had come across to the jury as the "strong" person in the
family, articulately portraying the defendant's upbringing and
problems. Then, however, she broke down sobbing on the
stand and begged the jury to spare her brother's life.
The testimony's effect was profound. One juror kept coming
back to the sister's testimony because it brought the case to a
"personal level"; the juror stated that the family members' tes-
timony was the only mitigating factor that made her much less
did not like having to hear such emotional testimony, the jury in the case did return a
life sentence, and the juror interviews highlighted the mother and brother's testimony
as highly influential.
,01 Mothers often struck emotional chords with the jurors: "His mom reminded me
of my own mom in some ways. Just from the sadness she was going through. I know
if my mom had to go through that she would have been hurt.... [His mother] was
very hurt, begging for his life." (ML,4). "The mother reminded me of sort of a
stereotypical mother, and my heart went out to her. And I know stereotypical-
there are lots of stereotypical mothers-but she just reminded me of a 'mom.' She
just broke my heart. I felt very sorry for her." (F.D,).
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likely to vote for death, (F L,,). Another juror, who had been a
holdout for death because of the circumstances of the crime,
identified the family members' testimony and the effect the death
penalty would have on them as what persuaded him to vote for
life without parole rather than a death sentence: "I think that
was the most mitigating thing that would lead us away from the
death penalty-just how it was devastating to [the defendant's
family]. That basically, having him put to death is just going to
create more victims .... ." (M19L10). For this juror, the decision
had come down to balancing the manner of killing, which for him
warranted a death sentence, against "compassion and mercy...
for the family," (M,gL,0); in the end, compassion for the family
won out.
Not all jurors were emotionally swayed by such testimony.
One juror, for instance, discounted such witnesses precisely be-
cause they "were really for sympathy rather than factual input,"
(MI4D,), and another juror questioned the family witnesses' cred-
ibility, noting that the family's testimony "was to be expected,"
(MAD 6). One juror gave a different reason for discounting such
testimony, stating that at first he was moved by the testimony of
the defendant's mother when she "pleaded for life without pa-
role so she could have some time to call him and write to him."
(F D14). The juror observed, however, that the testimony of the
defendant's mother was largely negated by the victim's mother,
who said, "'That was not thought about when they killed [my
son]. I can't talk to him. I can't write to him.' The battle be-
tween the two mothers was real dramatic as far as I was con-
cerned." In the end, therefore, although this juror "felt sorry"
for the defendant's mother, "it really did not influence us. We
had to go by the facts." (FD 14) .
Even the disavowals, however, suggest that the family testimony
had some effect. At the risk of over-psychoanalyzing those jurors
102 The juror's statements suggest that the emotional impact of the testimony of the
defendant's family in mitigation may be dampened through the prosecution's use of
victim impact statements. Many of the study's cases were tried at a time when victim
impact statements were constitutionally banned from capital cases, Booth v. Maryland,
482 U.S. 496, 501-02 (1987), or when the use of such statements was uncertain
following the Supreme Court's overruling of Booth in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S.
808, 830 (1991). Consequently, victim impact statements were not a factor in most of
the study's cases.
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who insisted that family testimony did not influence them, one
cannot resist noticing the ambivalence that permeates many of
their statements. Recall, for instance, the juror who "had a big
old lump in her throat" as the defendant's mother pleaded for
his life. When asked if the testimony affected her decision, she
responded:
Yeah it did. No, not [in] the decision. I just felt for her. I didn't
feel for him. I felt for his mother, you know, because she was a
church-goer and all that. He was just a bad seed. Because the
other kids were not like that. (F33L,4).
Similarly, a juror in a different case, after talking about how the
defendant's mother "got very emotional on the stand" and say-
ing that the "mother... cast a lot of doubt in my mind about his
need for capital punishment," proceeded to state that the testi-
mony "didn't have anything to do with my decision." (F29D,). It
may be many jurors believe that such emotion should not play a
role in their decision but, at the same time, they cannot fully es-
cape its effects. 3 Such an effect can be seen in one juror's reac-
tion to the mere presence of the defendant's children at trial
(they did not testify). When asked if she ever imagined herself
in the situation of the defendant's family, the juror stated:
I mean sure, there was a fleeting glance. I mean, you can imag-
ine those kids and their mother's going through this! I mean
yes, I did that, but I didn't dwell on it. I mean as a school teacher
I look at the ten- and twelve-year-old and go, "Oh!" (F35L2 ).
As powerful as it may be, the emotional impact of family tes-
timony is but one aspect of the testimony's influence. The tes-
timony also can provide critical first-hand factual input by pro-
viding a context for understanding the defendant's actions. Espe-
cially valuable in this sense is the family historian, the individual
who can tell the stories, both good and bad, that help the jurors
picture what life was like for the defendant. In one case, for in-
13 While the United States Supreme Court has held that it is constitutional to
instruct the jury that they cannot consider sympathy at the penalty phase, California
v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538,543 (1987), the California practice during the time the study's
cases were tried was that "anti-sympathy" instructions "'should never be given in a
capital penalty trial."' People v. Hamilton, 756 P.2d 1348, 1365 n.7 (Cal. 1988) (en
banc) (quoting People v. Brown, 726 P.2d 516,529 n.7 (Cal. 1985) (en banc)).
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stance, the defendant had been subjected to horrific child abuse
by the father. While the defendant's child abuse also was docu-
mented through neutral sources like court documents, it was the
sisters' stories that every interviewed juror consistently remem-
bered. Perhaps as remarkable as the sisters' testimony is how
distinctly and in what detail the jurors remembered the testi-
mony even several years after the trial:
It was an exceptionally horrid upbringing.., severe, acute child
abuse, child neglect, child torture.... His father, this was es-
sentially the reason why I decided for life .... The child abuse
stories were from his sisters and neighbors .... [The father]
raped all the daughters and we heard graphically about the
daughters' experiences with their father. He would be at the
kids mercilessly. He would tie [the defendant] up for a day,
two days at a time. He would have his girlfriend over. He
would make the daughters wait on him while he was having sex
with his girlfriend, with the mother downstairs. The only thing
that [the defendant] ever loved was a dog and a rabbit. One
day the father killed the rabbit and tried to make the dog eat
the rabbit. The dog wouldn't do it so he killed the dog. He was
drunk all the time. Whatever food there was he'd take and give
the kids nothing [but] chicken feet. He would beat the mother
up and got into fights at bars, was antagonistic, was hateful. He
hated [the defendant] because he was the darkest skin[ned]. In
those days dark black skin was considered less desirable and
the father was light skin[ned]. He always told [the defendant]
he wasn't his kid. One time he locked them all in a bureau, for
over twenty-four hours, all five kids hunched up, while he was
drunk. He beat them with razor straps. One time [he] poured
alcohol on them. He had them tied up, was beating them with
straps and poured alcohol on them to see them writhe with
more pain. He chased the girls, they would run to the car. He
had sex with them continuously from when they were four to
about sixteen. He would make the girls, when they went on a
car trip.., he made them sit with their legs spread open with a
mirror on the floor of the car so he could look up their
dresses.... We graphically heard from the sisters how he beat
them, neglected them, the acute child abuse. (ML 6).
One of the sisters testified that the only reason she went to her




Stories such as those that the sisters told, stories that made
the jurors visualize the defendant as a small child watching his
pets, his only sources of love in a hate-filled home, killed in front
of him by a monstrous father, are the verbal pictures that are
worth a thousand clinical words."°t With such background, the
jury can look at a picture of the defendant "in his little sailor
suit [when] he was only four or five years old," (F37L6), and, for
at least a moment, see the defendant as someone other than the
adult sitting twenty feet away on trial for two repulsive torture
murders. Without such a context, though, the introduction of
childhood pictures is more likely to be seen as just an effort to
play on the jury's emotions. 5
Sometimes, the family witnesses themselves became evidence
for the jury to consider. In several cases, for instance, in which a
parent testified about neglecting or abusing the defendant, ju-
rors clearly were studying the parent's demeanor as well as lis-
tening to what she was saying. Some jurors responded to such
witnesses by transferring their hostility from the defendant to
the parent:
[The mother's] manner was harsh and annoying, but may have
ultimately helped [the] defendant, because [the] jurors trans-
ferred hostility towards defendant to [the] mother for her fail-
ures.... I mean everybody voiced the same statement, that the
party that deserved to be on trial was the mother.... She
raised more emotion among the jurors than the defendant did.
(M L,5).
Several jurors had a similar reaction in another case in which
the defendant's alcoholic father testified about his abuse of the
defendant as a child. The jurors said that while they had felt
"anger and rage" towards the defendant at the guilt stage, at the
114 A juror in a different case made a similar observation:
Interviewer: What defense evidence or witness at the punishment stage of the
trial was most important or influential, in your mind, and why?
Juror: His mom's.... I think basically we got a little more understanding of
what a rotten childhood the guy had. Which I guess made you understand how
he could do what he did. (F L15).
10, As a juror said in another case, "They introduced photos of [the defendant]
when he was a little kid. Some of the people on the jury resented the idea of trying
to present the defendant as an innocent little child." (M2gD,3).
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penalty phase they now felt the "anger and rage" on behalf of
the defendant towards his parents. (F,,L,; M2L4). Other jurors,
while upset with the father, also felt sorry for him as he cried
and pleaded for mercy. (M3,L4).1  Interestingly, in the same case,
the defendant's testimony proved critical, but not just because
of the substance of what he said. After observing the defendant
testify, the jury really did believe that he was as mentally im-
paired as the experts and family had claimed."0 7
Thus, the testimony of family witnesses, testimony somewhat
unique to capital cases in terms of its permitted breadth, gener-
ally had a more positive influence on the jury than one might
first expect given its inherent bias problems. The favorable im-
pact may result, in part, from the difficulty of cross-examining a
witness on matters such as their love or remorse ("You don't
really love your son, do you?") or on delicate factual matters
such as abuse suffered by the defendant and his siblings ("Now,
those whippings with the electrical cord were not really that se-
vere, were they?"), especially if the jury has become emotionally
protective of the witness."8 Consequently, it is very difficult for a
"I Similarly, in another case where the parents testified about how they had abused
the defendant, all of the interviewed jurors said they were moved by the parents'
testimony. One juror singled out the father's testimony as the most influential
because "he was broken up and he was remorseful for what had happened, how he
had treated him, what [the defendant] had done, and his role in creating who [the
defendant] was. He was crying for most of his testimony. It... had the most
impact." (M,,D,,). In this case, however, the jury still returned a death sentence.
0 Interestingly, the defendant's difficulty in testifying articulately was interpreted
by one juror as showing remorse ("Sometimes he found it difficult to speak, he was so
remorseful." (M,L).), and by others as evidence of his mental impairment ("[He was
j]ust not very intelligent. Like a kid emotionally." (M2 L4).). But with either reaction,
it worked in making the jury sympathetic: "Like I said, he wasn't very bright. They
wanted us to see his lack of intelligence, they wanted us to pity him. That's why they
put him on the stand, and it worked." (M,,L4).
"Jurors generally understood why a prosecutor would not strenuously cross-
examine a family witness:
One of the things that stood out was when the sisters were on the stand, the
prosecutor did not go after them or try and dispute what they said like a lot of
us thought that he might. He pretty much let it in.... The defense witnes-
ses.., you could see were visibly, emotionally shaken by the testimony. He
seemed to be very receptive to that and didn't go after them [like he did the
expert witnesses in the first phase]. (M,,L 6).
Another juror in the same case also noted the prosecutor's approach and thought it
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prosecutor to cast doubt on such testimony other than to point out
the witness's relationship to the defendant, a relationship which,
in many cases, adds to the emotional impact of the testimony.
This is not to say that a witness cloaked with familial or friend-
ship ties automatically will be embraced by the jury. Not sur-
prisingly, witnesses of dubious character, such as fellow inmates,
made very negative impressions." And even a normally sympa-
thetic witness, such as a mother, may backfire if she does not
play the "mother's role" properly. In one notable example, a
juror explained:
This may sound weird, but his mother... seemed to hurt him,
not help him.... She just didn't seem that concerned about it,
astute ... not to cross-examine the sisters too much. He tried to show that all
the kids didn't go out murdering people. There wasn't a whole lot he could do.
The main thing he tried to point out was that "I'm not going to deny there was
abuse, but it still doesn't justify the behavior." (M5 L6).
When a prosecutor did try to discredit a defendant's mother, one juror in particular
strongly objected (the juror otherwise had only admiration for the prosecutor):
His mother, like I said, reminded me [of mine]. And that's the only time I
really got mad at the prosecutor, the way he was talking to her.... Of course,
he was just doing his job. The way he was asking her questions though! The
woman was up there pleading for her son's life. (MD,).
The juror returned to the topic later:
During the [mother's] testifying, they went into great detail, that's where I felt
that the prosecuting attorney was browbeating the mother.... It was more like
a leering or a sneering-like "attitude" towards her. She was there trying to
defend her son.., and I don't think she was lying about his background. But
he tried to make us believe that she was "piling it on," just his general attitude
towards her. I mean, he wasn't really being disrespectful to her, but it was just,
I think it was just, overkill. (MD,).
10, What is surprising is that such witnesses were called in the first place. These
were not fact witnesses at the guilt phase, such as eyewitnesses, where the attorneys
must take their witnesses as they find them, see supra note 44, but witnesses called to
testify as to the defendant's character. As character witnesses, their reception was
uniformly negative:
"I mean, to have people in prison uniforms be your character witnesses? I
mean come on! I mean they're saying what a great guy he was." (MMD,,).
"There was a couple [of witnesses] that they brought from jail-inmates.... It
was as if they were afraid to talk almost. You know, they would start to and
then one didn't want to talk.... I just didn't believe them.... [They testified
about] what type of person he was." (F28D,,).
"[The defense] brought out all of these so-called character witnesses. They
were friends of his .... " (M,,L). (The friends were not inmates, but the jury
thought from the friends' appearance and testimony that they Were of dubious
character.)
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it seemed like she practically had to work up emotion for him.
This one brother was back there crying. They should have had
him testify. But he didn't. Her testimony was about arguments
with him, there were a ton of them. (F24D7).
Another juror in the same case had an almost identical reaction
when asked if any defense testimony backfired:
I'd say the mother's testimony. I think because we had to go
through an interpreter it lost a lot of its emotional impact that
it might have had. She talked about the father dying, you know,
they were very poor. How [the defendant] wanted to take over
and be the man of the family.... And then when she remarried
he had a hard time getting along. She said stuff like he was a
good boy. People, I guess, were expecting her like to plead for
his life, you know. She didn't really get into doing any of that.
He had her bring in photographs and she showed photographs
of when he was younger and growing up. I'd say maybe due to
having to go through a translator, the impact of her testimony
was maybe lost. (F D,).
And, most devastatingly, in rare instances family members or
close friends actively testify against the defendant ("[When] some-
body who loves you like a mother testifies against you, yuck! It
doesn't say much for you at all." (F,,Do).)," ° or, though called as
defense witnesses, ask the jury to impose the death penalty."'
Finally, family and friends testimony was effective only when
presented in sufficient detail so as to present a coherent and full
factual picture of the defendant. Without such a factual back-
drop, the jury was likely to view such character testimony deri-
sively, as an effort to manipulate them:
It seemed that the reasons they gave [as to why the defendant
was of a good character] ... actually there were two, were very
lame. Like as a character reference this one kid who went to
110 This witness was called by the prosecution as a fact witness at the guilt phase.
" This occurred in only one case and none of the interviewed jurors were certain
whether this was a defense strategy or was unexpected. The defendant's brother, a
police officer, testified about his love for the defendant but then "pleaded" for a
death sentence because being locked up for life would be worse than the death
penalty. (F,,D). His sisters, on the other hand, pleaded for life. The jurors uniformly
described the brother's testimony as "very emotional" and stated that it made a
powerful impression. The jury voted for death.
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school with [him], part of the high school while he was there,
said "Oh, he was such a good student; he was very good at
writing, not writing stories, just good penmanship." That [was]
the only thing, maybe he was nervous or something, but that's
all he actually said-everybody liked him and he had very good
penmanship. It was lame. And then the other one, whatever
reasons or examples that he gave were unbelievable to me. It
was something about what a great guy that he spent his whole
weekend camping running around pulling Volkswagens out of
ditches. We just thought, when you're camping, how many
Volkswagens are in ditches? How wonderful was this for a
character reference? That was just to prove what a wonderful
person he was. (F21L9).
That such testimony would be viewed as feeble hardly can be
surprising. For some reason, when measured against the defen-
dant's grisly murder, good penmanship just does not seem very
weighty. But even this type of testimony might have carried
some weight if the defense had a larger factual context within
which such testimony could be considered. For example, if the
defendant had come from a highly abusive background or had
very limited mental abilities,"2 the jury might view as noble or
worthy any efforts by the defendant to succeed or help others,
even if such efforts were fairly modest. Without such a context,
though, random descriptions of a defendant's "good deeds" are
likely to seem almost insultingly trivial to the jury when con-
trasted with the defendant's crime.1 3
' This is not to suggest that the defense attorneys failed in this case. Indeed, the
jury sentenced the defendant to life, but mainly because they viewed the victim, a
woman who the defendant "picked up" at a biker's bar, as putting herself in a vulner-
able situation. The attorneys may have been hindered by a lack of mitigating evi-
dence from developing a factual background. In most capital cases, however, investi-
gation usually will reveal a fairly compelling personal story. See generally Haney,
supra note 31, at 562-602 (describing variety of mitigating factors commonly affecting
capital defendants).
- A number of jurors noted what they believed were defense efforts to overplay
insignificant acts as being important. One juror's comment typifies the reaction:
"The girlfriend I'm speaking of had a little boy and [the defendant] liked the little
boy, so that's why they thought he was a nice guy. See, that was for him, character,
for him." (MD,). In a different case, a juror stated:
"[The defendant] was a wimp, I mean he was a nothing that was going, oper-
ating on false steam. He came in with all these character witnesses that were
testifying to what a wonderful man he was. It was all forty years ago, when he
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IV. WRITING THE COMPLETE SCORE
For the attorney composing the presentation of her case, the
jurors' responses to the various types of witnesses make it evi-
dent that each witness category has its own benefits and liabili-
ties. Professional experts can offer an overall perspective as to
how events and disabilities might have led to the defendant's ac-
tions, but the jury will view their testimony with a hefty dose of
skepticism because of the experts' lack of extensive interaction
with the defendant and their perceived role as a "hired gun."
Lay experts, on the other hand, avoid the negative connotations
of being a hired gun and can offer a "real life" perspective on
the defendant's life and potential, but may not be able to offer a
larger context within which to understand the defendant's situa-
tion. Family and friends witnesses serve both an emotional and
factual role: They make the jury realize that the defendant is a
person about whom others care and are able to sketch a picture
of the defendant's life as only someone close to the defendant
could. The jury, though, approaches family testimony cautiously
given the strong bias for the defendant, and sometimes dis-
counts it as a defense ploy to play upon their emotions.
Because each category of testimony has its intrinsic strengths
and weaknesses, the most successful defense cases tended to use
a combination of different types of testimony to create a coher-
ent defense theme. To return to the symphony analogy, the most
successful presentations of evidence were those where each type
of witness, while playing a different melody, was orchestrated to
be in harmony with each other.
Bringing together different witness types can be especially ef-
fective, because the strengths and weaknesses of the different wit-
ness types are largely complementary. For example, the jurors'
primary criticisms of the professional expert (a lack of substan-
tive knowledge of the defendant and being a hired gun) are the
perceived strengths of the lay witnesses (a real life perspective
on the defendant and lack of bias). And, of course, the weak-
ness of the lay expert (lack of a wider context within which to
understand the defendant's actions) is what the professional ex-
went to high school, when he lived ... with his family, when he was in the
Navy." (M,).
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pert can best explain based upon her training and education.
Family members' testimony similarly interlocks with the other
types of testimony. Family testimony can provide emotional in-
put and detailed facts that the professional and lay experts nor-
mally cannot, but it suffers from credibility problems based on
bias. Lay and professional experts, therefore, may be invaluable
in bolstering the family testimony by providing objective verifi-
cation of the family testimony concerning the defendant's back-
ground, traits, and the like. The complementary effect, how-
ever, will only be achieved if the witnesses' testimony unites to
tell a comprehensive and compelling story.
Noting the complementary strengths and weaknesses of the
different types of witnesses does not, of course, mean that an at-
torney will always be able to orchestrate a convincing case by
picking and choosing among a smorgasbord of witnesses. Cases
vary in the strength of their mitigating and aggravating factors
and in the availability and persuasiveness of their witnesses-
not all mothers are able to bring a tear to the jury's eye.' In-
deed, cases may arise in which the aggravating factors are so
heinous and the availability of mitigating evidence so limited that
even the most talented and energetic attorney could not com-
pose a compelling case in mitigation. The findings do suggest,
however, that an attorney can maximize the persuasive value of
her case by searching out different types of witnesses and en-
suring that the testimony they present harmonizes as much as
possible.
Two cases in particular illustrate how juries are likely to re-
spond when the different types of witnesses harmonize in or-
chestrated form and when they do not. These cases were chosen
in part because their results, although not startling, were not
necessarily preordained. In both cases, the defense had a fair
amount of mitigation evidence with which to work in shaping its
case, but the facts of the crime were so highly disturbing that the
jury was predisposed towards a death sentence after the guilt-
innocence phase. How the jury perceived the case in mitigation,
therefore, was crucial to how they responded.
14 See supra notes 110-111 and accompanying text.
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A. Case Study: A Failure to Harmonize
In the first case, the jury returned a death sentence in the face
of what would normally be thought of as highly persuasive miti-
gating evidence: The defendant had a long-standing battle with
a severe mental disorder. At first blush, such a disorder would
seem to be a particularly persuasive mitigating circumstance be-
cause it reinforces the theme to which jurors respond most favor-
ably, that the defendant had no real control over his actions."5
Moreover, the defendant had no prior criminal history, a factor
that usually weighs heavily towards a life sentence. 6 So why did
the jury return a death sentence?117
The answer lies largely in the need to recognize that a par-
ticular line of defense will have a number of different effects on
a jury, all of which must be addressed. Severe mental illness in
particular, although appearing to be a compelling mitigating cir-
cumstance, raises a number of collateral issues that may lead
the jury to vote for a sentence of death rather than life."8
115 See Geimer, supra note 42, at 289 (stressing importance of defense counsel prov-
ing at penalty phase "an impairing event.., over which [the defendant] had no
control and for.., which she cannot justly be held responsible").
116 When asked if the lack of a prior criminal history would make them less likely to
impose a death sentence, one-half of the Project's California jurors said it would
make them much less likely (20%) or slightly less likely (30%). Moreover, on the
aggravation side of the equation, a history of violent crime made the jurors much
more likely (31%) or slightly more likely (40%) to impose the death penalty.
117 The analysis of the case is not meant to suggest that the defense attorneys were
ineffective or provided less than excellent representation. The critique is presented
solely from the jurors' perspective as to why they were not persuaded by the de-
fendant's case in mitigation. It is an effort to explore how the jurors' concerns might
have been counteracted by different types of witnesses and stories-if they were
available. It may be that the only witnesses and stories that existed were those pre-
sented by the defense and that they simply were not sufficiently compelling to
overcome the prosecution's very strong case in aggravation.
It should also be noted that the defendant in this case was African-American and
the victims were white, a factor that has been identified as increasing the possibility
of a death sentence. See infra note 130.
8 See James M. Doyle, The Lawyers' Art: "Representation" in Capital Cases, 8 Yale
J.L. & Human. 417, 444-45 (1996) (noting difficulties of presenting mental illness as
mitigation evidence); Ellsworth et al., supra note 19, at 88-89 (experiment found that
the 19 "death-qualified" mock jurors were significantly less likely to accept schizo-
phrenia, compared to organic brain disorder, as basis for insanity defense; experiment
did not address use of mental disease in deciding between life without parole and
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In this case, for instance, the jury understandably was highly
concerned about the defendant's future dangerousness both to
society and to the prison population."9 The defendant had bru-
tally murdered randomly chosen victims. The defense called a
number of psychiatric experts who testified about the defen-
dant's history of mental illness and how it might have affected
his actions. But the psychiatrists' testimony, while convincing
the jury that the defendant was mentally ill, also raised grave
concerns about whether the defendant might kill in prison or es-
cape. Indeed, part of the psychiatric history focused on how the
defendant had been released from hospitals (one juror used the
term "escaped"), stopped taking his medication, and then had
psychotic episodes." As one juror explained her decision to
change her vote from life to death:
death penalty); Perlin, supra note 75, at 245-49 (noting studies suggesting that mental
illness is not an effective mitigating factor because of juror attitudes).
While a severe mental illness mitigation theme poses a number of presentation
problems for counsel, a significant majority of the Project's California jurors (75%)
stated that if the defendant had "a history of mental illness," they would be at least
slightly less likely to vote for death (24% said "much less likely" and 51% said "slightly
less likely").
119 Other than the facts of the crime itself, the defendant's future dangerousness and
the need to prevent the defendant from ever killing again tend to be the most dis-
cussed topics in deliberations. See Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly
Confusion: Juror Instructions in Capital Cases, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 4-6 (1993)
(reviewing Project data from South Carolina). Even in California, where the jury is
told that the only alternative sentence to death is life without parole, juries in the
Project focused heavily on future dangerousness either out of a concern that the
defendant in fact would be paroled at some time or that he would kill in prison: 52%
of California jurors said keeping the defendant from ever killing again was a "very"
great concern in making their decision, and an additional 20% stated it was a "fairly"
important concern. Moreover, despite the life-without-parole instruction, 50% of the
California jurors were concerned that the defendant "might get back into society
someday" if not given the death penalty (23% were "greatly" concerned, 15% were
"somewhat" concerned, and 12% were "slightly" concerned).
,z Consider the following juror's comments:
Juror: Well, they all, everyone who testified, the doctors were-it seems to
me-and the way the law was at the hospitals that they could not keep him
restricted in the hospital without, unless they thought he would be a harm to
himself or to someone else. It seems to me the defense brought that up, I can't
remember whether it was [the] prosecution or defense. Under the law, they
had to release him when maybe they shouldn't-when definitely they should
not have. Because the doctors could not come up with conclusive evidence that
he was a danger to himself or to society. They gave him medication, and said
he could be released with medication.
Interviewer: And how did this [evidence] backfire [on the defendant]?
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We discussed that if he were given life he would be in an eight
by eight cell for the rest of his life but might be, with good be-
havior, released for exercise and have to be around other pris-
oners and that could be dangerous.... What we decided was
that regardless of his illness, if he was a danger to society, then
the only solution would be the capital punishment. (F29D,).
Consequently, the defense's mitigation evidence of mental ill-
ness was a double-edged sword that needed to be addressed.'21
While admittedly speculative, having prison officials or psychi-
atric personnel testify about the treatment of mentally ill in-
mates might have helped dull the dangerousness edge of the
sword and allay the safety concerns inadvertently raised by the
doctors' testimony." Some assurance that the defendant would
be in a highly controlled environment may have persuaded the
jurors that the risk of further violence was minimized. Along
these same lines, the presentation of lay expert testimony (such
as a teacher, social worker, or pastor) that the defendant func-
tioned well when on medication might have further bolstered
the jury's sense that the defendant could safely be sentenced to
life without parole.
The jurors also expressed an interest in hearing more regard-
ing the defendant's illness and its effects. While the family's tes-
timony was emotionally powerful and several friends testified,
some jurors wondered why they had not heard from more lay
witnesses about the illness's effects on the defendant, causing
them to question some of the family's and friends' testimony.
The jurors also could not relate any particularly memorable an-
ecdotes about the defendant's struggles with mental illness be-
Juror: He killed some people. He didn't take the medication, that type of
mental illness-it's well known that people [with the defendant's mental
illness] do not want to take their medication. (FD,).
121 As one juror succinctly put it when asked about the strongest factors for and
against the death penalty: "For: His incurability. Against: His illness." (F29D,). For a
discussion of the "two-edged sword" problem, see Ralph Reisner & Christopher
Slobogin, Law and the Mental Health System: Civil and Criminal Aspects 580-83 (2d
ed. 1990).
1221 have found it somewhat surprising, both with cases in which I have been in-
volved and with cases in the Project, how cooperative prison officials generally have
been in capital cases in testifying about the security of their facilities and their ability
to handle difficult prisoners. This fact may be a result of professional pride----"no one
is escaping under my watch"-or just representative of the fact that prisons, on the
whole, tend to be quite secure.
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yond the testimony concerning the defendant's stays in mental
hospitals and a general disintegration in his behavior." They
did not recall, for instance, any vivid stories from lay experts,
like teachers or ministers, that painted for them a picture of an
"innocent" youth succumbing to a mental disease beyond his
control. The lack of anecdotal images of how the defendant's
mental illness affected him, assuming such anecdotes existed,
could be seen as particularly detrimental if the studies are cor-
rect which suggest that jurors respond to mental illness defenses
only when the defendant exhibits an extreme disorder.24
The lack of vivid imagery was likely compounded by the fact
that the defendant was heavily medicated during the trial. While
the defendant's drugged state was explained to the jury, his flat
emotional state and demeanor meant that they had no real sense
of the defendant except through the defense witnesses. As with
other capital jury studies, the jurors in the Project paid great at-
tention to the defendant's demeanor and whether he gave any in-
dications of remorsefulness." And, in this case, their descriptions
made clear that they had been observing him: They described him
as "catatonic," (M,,D5); "show[ing] no emotion... ambivalent,"
(M 4D5); and "detached... totally withdrawn," (FD 5).1'
1 Recall, for example, the vivid tales of child abuse that jurors remembered in other
cases. See supra Section III.C. In contrast, the one tidbit that a juror recalled from the
testimony of the defendant's brother was that the "brother said that when [the defend-
ant] was young, he could take a motorcycle apart and put it back together." (FD).
,14 See Perlin, supra note 75, at 266-67.
" See William S. Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death:
Operative Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 Am. J. Crim. L. 1, 51-52
(1987-88) (finding that some jurors gave great weight to remorse in deciding whether
to impose death sentence); Perlin, supra note 75, at 277-78 (noting difficult choices of
defense attorney as to what to tell jury when defendant is heavily drugged on antipsy-
chotic medicine). Cf. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 142-43 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (noting the weight jurors place on demeanor, the behavioral side effects of
many antipsychotic drugs, and the resulting due process problems involved in invol-
untary administration of such drugs to criminal defendants).
"16 One juror, despite acknowledging that the defendant was drugged, stated, "If he
would have spoken, even only in fragments, [it] would have helped in determining if
he really was mentally ill or could kill again. It seemed to be a disputable factor as to
whether he was putting it on or if he really heard voices telling him to do things."
(F,9D,). Cf. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135-37 (holding that unless there are no less intrusive
alternatives, forced medication of defendant in capital case violates due process be-
cause it impairs defendant's ability to present defense at trial and alters his outward
appearance to jury).
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In fact, according to one juror, some of the family and friend
testimony did more harm than good by creating a perceived in-
consistency in the mitigation story:
Juror: A friend of his had, there's something that just really
struck us that negated some of the evidence that they were
trying to put forward. Didn't look like he had been well
coached. Something about going out and doing some drink-
ing.... [T]he particular witness, who was a friend of [the de-
fendant], did appear to negate some of the weak evidence they
had presented.... Their main defense line was the insanity or
that he didn't have mental capacity. That was established as
their main line of defense and this guy, I think, had... inad-
vertently torpedoed a little bit of that.... [In talking about the
defendant's competency, this friend noted the defendant said,]
"Let's go out and get a drink." That was during one of the
evenings he was supposed to be totally "wacko" according to
the defense line. That one evening, I think [the defendant]
said, "Hey, let's go out and have a beer." That struck me as
being very inconsistent with the general line of defense that this
guy was supposed to be in outer space.
Interviewer: So he had gone out social drinking?
Juror: Yeah, like he was normal. (M36D,).
Although difficult to anticipate, testimony about the defendant's
behavior often creates perceived holes in the mitigation story,
and jurors, shocked by the brutality of the crime, often will be
waiting to spot inconsistencies as evidence that the defense is
trying to fool them. Yet these testimonial offshoots are less
likely to be viewed as inconsistent if placed in context by a pro-
fessional expert or a lay expert. In this case, for example, a so-
cial worker who helps place mentally ill individuals in jobs might
have been able to explain that people with severe mental ill-
nesses often have lucid moments interspersed with psychotic
episodes. Indeed, such lucid moments might provide the jury a
basis for hope that, if properly treated, the defendant could con-
trol himself in prison and perhaps even be productive.
Keeping in mind that attorneys are limited by the material
they have available, this was a case in which the different types
of testimony did not come together to form a persuasive theme
for the jury. While some jurors questioned the severity of the
defendant's illness, the jury as a whole believed that he was
11691997]
Virginia Law Review
mentally ill and even the prosecution's psychiatrist conceded
mental illness.127 But after hearing the penalty evidence, the jury
seemed uncertain of how to use it and was pulled in different di-
rections by its implications. To the extent they believed the doc-
tors as to the severity of the defendant's illness, the physicians'
testimony seemed to suggest that the defendant would be highly
dangerous in prison. And while they found the mother's testi-
mony emotionally powerful, they also felt as if they had rela-
tively little factual background on the defendant's character
change, which caused some of the jurors to question the defense
psychiatrists' testimony about the illness's severity. There were
no lay experts to bridge the factual and credibility gaps or ex-
plain how mentally ill individuals can be successfully integrated
in structured settings. As a result, the jury tossed and turned
with the decision, but ultimately resolved the conflicts in favor
of death-some because of dangerousness, some because they
believed the brutality of the crime outweighed his illness, and
some for both reasons.'
B. Case Study: Three-Part Harmony
The second case involved an extremely brutal and senseless
murder of a young woman with whom the defendant was casu-
ally acquainted. She had invited him over to her apartment af-
ter he telephoned her and said that he needed to speak with her.
Once in the apartment, the defendant gagged the victim with
her own clothing, violently raped her, bound her hands, stran-
gled her to death with a towel, and then wiped the scene clean
of fingerprints. 9 The jury heard evidence establishing the de-
127The prosecution expert, however, maintained that the defendant knew the dif-
ference between right and wrong, a conclusion that the jury accepted in rejecting the
defendant's insanity defense at the guilt phase. (F,0D5).
128 One juror in particular was troubled by the verdict. The juror broke down crying
shortly into the interview and later turned out to have at first voted for life without
parole. The rest of the jury finally convinced the juror, however, that the jury in-
structions required him to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors, and the balance
tilted in favor of death because the "[o]verwhelming aggravating circumstances [of
the brutal multiple killings] could not be overcome. I tried to find a way but couldn't."
(M.D,).
"I One juror, responding to a question about whether he continued to think about
anything from the trial, hauntingly replied: "Images.... Photos of the crime scene
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fendant's extensive criminal history of violent crime, including
first-hand testimony from a prior rape victim. Indeed, the de-
fendant had been connected with the murder only because he
was caught during a later crime spree that involved a violent as-
sault of one victim, the rape of another, and a bank robbery. In
terms of overall aggravating evidence, the case was extreme.
The case also involved an African-American defendant and
white victim, a combination that prior studies have found dis-
proportionately results in a death sentence.3'
Nevertheless, the jury returned a life sentence. And while
one must be careful in attributing the verdict to particular fac-
tors, the interviewed jurors were all strongly persuaded by the
defendant's case in mitigation, a case that involved the effective
integration of all three types of witness testimony. It became
clear that by the conclusion of deliberations, the jury had agreed
upon a distinctive picture of the defendant, his background, and
his potential to adapt to prison.
Family testimony was critical in establishing that the defen-
dant had a "hideous" childhood, one that it was "amazing [the
defendant] survived." (M37L,2). His sister and aunt were the pri-
mary witnesses for describing his childhood, and their testimony
included a number of stories that the jury remembered, includ-
ing most vividly that the defendant as a teenager had been a
witness to the rape and murder of his own mother. The testi-
mony about the physical abuse, the family's drug use, and the
mother's prostitution had a powerful impact on certain jurors.
One juror, who after hearing the horrors of the guilt phase and
the details of the defendant's other crimes had been "pretty
sure" that the death penalty should be imposed, came away with
a different understanding after hearing the mitigation evidence:
and of the victim. I fairly well remember the brutality aspect: the bruising, tightness
of the clothing used to tie her up with... the bruising and the brutality of it." (ML,,- 2).
04 See, e.g., David C. Baldus et al., Law and Statistics in Conflict: Reflections on
McCleskey v. Kemp, in Handbook of Psychology and Law 251,259 (D.K. Kagehiro &
W.S. Laufer eds., 1992) (presenting statistical research that an African-American defend-
ant who kills a white victim has a significantly greater likelihood of receiving the death
sentence). Cf. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297, 299, 317-19 (1987) (finding
that, even if statistically accurate, the "Baldus Study" did not establish an Equal
Protection or Eighth Amendment violation).
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The family was very polarized, I would say. They had some
very-let's use the word bad--evil-some real bad--evil peo-
ple in that family. And they had some really nice people who
were really struggling to get along in that situation and ulti-
mately succeeded or failed to some degree, but they really had
some real polar personalities in that family. So some of those
people I did legitimately feel bad for and some of them I
thought-actually thought a few of the family members were
the people who should have been on trial. (M3L,,).
Similarly, another juror repeatedly talked of her sense of "rage"
towards the defendant's parents and her desire to "have them
brought in and hung." (F L2). Moreover, as sometimes happens
with family testimony, some jurors saw the sister who testified as
corroborating evidence that the defendant's background had in-
deed affected him: "His sister just kind of reinforced how he
was.., an alcoholic, which is so typical of people in this kind of
social situation." (FL 2 ).
1 31
As noted earlier, family testimony also can impress the jury
just by the very fact that someone cares about the defendant.
One juror stated that the testimony of such a witness formed the
most lasting impression she took away from the trial:
During the penalty phase, the public defender brought a char-
acter witness.. who was [the defendant's] legal guardian at
the time he was a child. I remember her because of her sincer-
ity and the way she was like a mother to [him]. She really cared
about the guy. She just seemed very believable. That was a
person who was a good character witness for the defense. She
was talking about [his] life, when he was a little kid, and after
she went through that, she was pleading for him not to be given
the death penalty. (MzL,2).
From the family testimony, therefore, the jury obtained a vivid
factual picture of the defendant's childhood, as well as its first
sense that the defendant had some personal attributes that
might allow him to make a positive contribution in prison.
This emerging picture of the defendant was critically rein-
forced by the testimony of two lay experts whom the jury found
13, Another juror also remembered that "his family was heavily into drugs and a
sister was a prostitute." (M3.I. 2).
1172 [Vol. 83:1109
The Jury as Critic
highly credible and influential. One was a Marine colonel under
whom the defendant had served. The colonel testified about
how the defendant had distinguished himself as a member of the
Corps, had an exemplary record, and could function positively
in a highly-structured setting. (M 7L,2). A juror even noted that
the defendant uncharacteristically showed emotion when the
colonel testified, providing an unconscious emphasis to the colo-
nel's testimony that this was someone whom the defendant re-
spected. The fact that the colonel, an impressive individual in
his own accomplishments, could testify from first-hand knowl-
edge about the defendant and give such a positive report made
him a highly effective witness, with at least one juror declaring
"the Marine's testimony... the most influential." (M37L,2). One
cannot help but think of the diminished impact if the defense had
introduced the defendant's military service simply through his
military records.
In a similar vein, a corrections officer testified that the defen-
dant had been a model prisoner and had adapted well to a
prison setting. As with the Marine colonel, the jurors noted that
the corrections official knew the defendant and, therefore, was
able to talk about what sentencing the defendant to life without
parole would mean in his case:
[He] knew him well because [the defendant] had been incar-
cerated before. He was a model prisoner. He testified not only
about what life without parole was like, but also what kind of
prisoner he had been in the past .... This guy was very credi-
ble. (F L,2).'
32
Coupled with the Marine colonel's testimony, the corrections
official reinforced the emerging theme of the defendant as an
individual who "when he was institutionalized, no matter what
the area-military or prison-he was a role model. Whenever
he was in a structured environment, he did very well." (F., 2).
These lay experts also were able to offer a hope that "he would
probably be able to be a productive human being inside the in-
13, A different juror similarly noted: "[The corrections official] described what [life
without parole] was about law-wise and what it meant in reality. He also said the
best he could say how it fit in [the defendant's] case." (ML 12).
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stitution," without which, the same juror said, she would have
voted for a death sentence. (F40LI2).
133
The importance of the lay experts' testimony cannot be over-
estimated given the prosecution's case for future dangerousness.
The evidence of the defendant's past crimes, especially the tes-
timony of the prior rape victim, had convinced the jury that the
defendant was extremely dangerous in society-at-large:
There was a gal that he had previously raped in an apartment
building he was in. He used the same method on her as he did
the one that he actually murdered. And she suffered a lot of
physical and mental pain after the episode was over. It was in-
fluential because to know that in fact what she was talking
about was true, it was not really if it was believable or not, it
was true. It just goes to show that the person, if I had a sense
of pity towards him, it's that he would never learn. That he was
dangerous. That he did it once, and he would do it again and
again. So it was influential from the standpoint that I thought
to myself that this guy cannot be out. (M L,2).M
But the Department of Corrections witness was able to counter
this concern by providing a realistic picture of the defendant's
confinement if sentenced to life without parole and by calming
any fears that the defendant would ever be released.1 35 His tes-
timony, along with the Marine colonel's assurances, convinced
the jury that the defendant's violence and misbehavior would
not carry over into the structured setting of a prison:
He was a good model prisoner. He was a good military guy,
but in society he was not a good functioning human being. I
would have not wanted him to have had the option to be re-
leased from prison. So I would have considered heavily the
13 "[The strongest factor against a life sentence would have been] if we didn't think
that [he] really would do anything constructive in prison." (F4L,,).
,34 A different juror described a similar reaction to the prior criminal history
evidence:
During the sentencing, it came up that he had past crimes. That was important
for me to know, because it shows me that there was a trend. It was important
for me to make sure if this trial was not going to put him away, then it would
allow him to be out in society again. That means that in all probability he
would commit another crime. (M3,L12).
135 See Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 119, at 4-6 (defendant's future dangerousness
is most discussed factor by jury other than facts of the crime).
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death penalty [if parole had been a possibility]. We were in-
structed that there would be absolutely no way that he'd be
able to be released or pardoned. (F, L,2).
Importantly, the lay experts' testimony also enabled the de-
fense to pursue aggressively, through professional expert testi-
mony, the theme that the defendant's background had essen-
tially turned the defendant into a "ticking bomb." (M37L,2). For
unlike the previous case, where the more the defense empha-
sized that the defendant's dangerous behavior resulted from his
mental disease, the more the jury worried about his release or
actions while in prison, here, the lay experts had persuasively
assured the jury that the defendant would be held in a highly se-
cure facility and would adjust to it well.
Aided by this testimonial backdrop, the professional expert, a
psychiatrist, was able to weave together the family testimony
and the defendant's actions, including his violent past, into an
evidentiary tapestry that made sense to the jury. And, at least
from the jurors' perspectives, the professional expert's testi-
mony made sense of how the defendant's past influenced his
present actions.'36 Critically for the defense, every interviewed
juror described the defendant's life and behavior in a way that
reflected an acceptance of the expert's testimony that the de-
fendant's criminal behavior was a product of his upbringing:
"[His] background, upbringing.., childhood abuse.... What he
learned was that violence is acceptable." (M38L,2). "He found
himself in a situation where I guess he was forced into doing
what he did." (M39L,2). "[H]e was at this point in his life where
somehow probably his definition of being good is a lot different
than your or my definition.... I don't think he was a good per-
son, not at all." (M39L,,). "He had been programmed for this
kind of behavior. He was a ticking bomb. He had several inci-
dents of varying degrees of severity of this kind of behavior. It's
unfortunate that the pattern was not spotted so that he could be
removed from that situation." (M37L,2). "The defendant's life
story-[it was] almost inevitable that the defendant's childhood
11 "The psychiatrist... built a basis for the defense that established mitigating cir-




led to a mental state where he would rape and kill women he
knew." (ML 12). One juror went so far as to state:
There are... hundreds, thousands of people just like him who
have not been given social skills as young children but are
thrown into an environment like this. I mean there is a lot of
anger, and rapes are very legitimate outbursts of anger, legiti-
mate in the way they've been brought up as a response to their
environment and their upbringing. (F40L 12).
Thus, unlike in many cases, the professional expert was seen
as very effective. Tellingly, however, they found him persuasive
because his testimony was consistent and interwoven with the
other evidence-both the prosecution's and defense's-and it
struck the jurors as being in accord with their common sense
("[T]he psychological background of [the defendant]-that tes-
timony reinforced how I felt." (FoL,2) (emphasis added).). The
expert's testimony was important not only in providing affir-
mance for those jurors inclined to take a more generous view of
the defendant's life, but also by giving those jurors something
concrete to point to during the jury deliberations to convince
the death-leaning jurors that the defendant's background did
indeed matter."'
It was in the jury deliberations that the effective orchestration
of the family, lay expert, and professional expert testimony be-
came most apparent. As happened in several of the cases, once
the jurors retired to the jury room they tried to put all of the
evidence together by making a time chart of the defendant's life.
For two-and-a-half days, the jury went through "the chronology
of [the defendant's] life." (M38Ll,). The interplay of the different
types of evidence, especially the role of the professional expert
as an accompanist rather than a soloist, is strikingly brought to-
gether by one of the juror's narratives:
We started a chronology of [his] life. We started and dis-
cussed... basically [from] infancy to being a small child to be-
ing an adolescent and up to the home and the environment he
lived in having to do with the role models: his father and mother.
137 One juror commented, "[T]he lack of understanding of his childhood was...
disputed.... Some people didn't have any sympathy and didn't have any under-
standing. There were experts... there that testified, so that helped." (F,>L 2).
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In this case, [he] did not have a good role model for a fa-
ther.... And his mother was not a good role model. She slept
with multiple men in his presence, with his knowledge, and was
doing drugs. His sister was a prostitute. Crime was prevalent in
his family at all levels, his mother, sister, brother.... We took
into consideration his performance in high school, both in ath-
letics and academics, as well as his performance in the more
meaningful things he did in his life. And that was the service.
He was exemplary. He was one of the elite Marines.... We
also considered [his] prior criminal record and his state of mind
leading up to just prior to the incident. We considered the act
of the murder.... [T]he brutality and extent of which he in-
flicted pain and suffering on his victim. And then, ultimately,
his confession and of course a couple of crimes he did even af-
ter the event. And we did all that from the perspective of [the
defendant], what he achieved and the interaction of people
throughout his life. Then we separately reviewed as we did this,
we related expert testimony and how they [explained] the events
in [his] life and how they might have contributed to the crime.
(M3sL12) (emphasis added).
And although not all of the jurors were initially inclined to vote
for life, eventually, after the jurors discussed all the evidence
and their differing views as to the "story" of the defendant and
his crime,'" a consensus emerged that life was the most appro-
priate penalty.
While one cannot ignore that an attorney is limited by the
quality of the witnesses and evidence available, the case does
illustrate how attorneys can harmonize the strengths and weak-
nesses of each type of witness into an effective mitigation theme
despite an extremely strong case in aggravation. Interestingly,
while each of the five interviewed jurors was impressed by every
3 One juror observed:
[I began developing a story] as soon as they started presenting the case. I used
the evidence as it was being presented, as well as later discussion during jury
deliberations to create a story. I had my own version of the story when the jury
started deliberating, but after discussion with the jury, the members, I was able
to kind of maybe adjust my conclusions of some certain facts. I did not have [a]
complete definite story to my satisfaction until just before the jury did its final
voting. (M 39Lq2 ).
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witness type, ' each juror also named a different witness-an
aunt, a legal guardian, the Marine colonel, the corrections offi-
cial, the psychiatrist-as the most influential in his or her deci-
sion, reaffirming the idea that it was the entire case in mitigation,
not just one aspect or witness, that swayed the jury to decide on
a life sentence. Even the defense attorney was pulled into the
equation by at least one juror who noted, "She was almost like
one of the character witnesses-her believability about her faith
in the case and that [the defendant] should not be sentenced to
death seemed completely believable and sincere." (ML 2). In
sum, because the defense paid attention to how the different
mitigation witnesses' themes sounded when played together, the
jury was far more receptive to the harmonized mitigation de-
fense than it otherwise might have been.
V. FINAL OBSERVATIONS
A. Experts as Storytellers
Considerable scholarly effort has been devoted to trying to
determine how juries make decisions. One model views juries
as using storytelling techniques to understand and evaluate evi-
dence presented at trial.'" In developing the story that they will
use in arriving at a verdict, jurors rely heavily upon their own
life experiences. Professors Pennington and Hastie have de-
scribed the process as consisting of three stages: Stage one in-
volves the jurors' using their worldview to produce a plausible
story from the evidence they have heard; in stage two, the jurors
take the judge's legal instructions and create categories of fea-
139 Not all witnesses, however, were effective with the jury. The defense called a
friend of the defendant as a witness whom at least one juror found less than credible
as "overplay[ing]" his testimony and appearing to have been "coached." (M37L,2).
140 Vidmar & Schuller, Juries and Expert Evidence, supra note 8, at 146 (storytelling
model "most widely accepted model" of jury decisionmaking). See generally Paul
Gewirtz, Victims and Voyeurs at the Criminal Trial, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 863 (1996)
(using storytelling as means of analyzing criminal trials, especially the use of victim
impact evidence and the role of the public as voyeurs). The storytelling model has
also been suggested as a means for understanding how capital juries make their
decisions. Valerie P. Hans, Death by Jury, in Challenging Capital Punishment: Legal
and Social Science Approaches 149, 161-63 (Kenneth C. Haas & James A. Inciardi
eds., 1988). The jurors in the Project even occasionally used storytelling terminology
to describe their thought processes. See supra note 138.
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tures for the verdict alternatives; and during stage three, the ju-
rors find the best correlation between the stories that have been
developed and the categories determining the verdict alterna-
tives.41
Although Pennington and Hastie did not apply their storytel-
ling framework to expert testimony, several efforts have been
made in the area. Professors Vidmar and Schuller, for example,
looked at a number of simulated and mock jury studies involving
social framework evidence to see how it might affect the stories
that jurors devise. '42 They concluded that jurors will generally
accept social framework evidence and use it in formulating their
stories, but the effect of such evidence varies according to con-
text.'43 Most noticeably, for example, the studies indicated that
the impact of such evidence is significantly heightened when it is
directly linked to the case and facts being decided.'" This Arti-
cle's findings certainly reinforce that hypothesis: Experts who
did not integrate their testimony with a case's specific facts and
the other testimony were far less likely to be seen as persuasive
than those who intertwined their testimony with the other evi-
dence presented. Vidmar and Schuller's review also concluded
that jurors "do not appear to suspend their own judgment in def-
erence to the expert,"1 45 nor do they use such evidence to "substi-
tute for their own judgments about the credibility of a lay wit-
ness."146 Again, these conclusions are consistent with this Article's
findings of great juror skepticism regarding experts and of jurors
using their own beliefs and attitudes to evaluate expert testimony.
Professor Lempert likewise has thought about expert witnesses
as storytellers, speculating that they can be seen as telling stories
in different ways: An expert can tell the key part of the story
(the disputed part of the story); an expert might fill in the "gaps"
141 Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision
Making, 51 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 242, 243-45 (1986). See also Reid Hastie
and Nancy Pennington, The O.J. Simpson Stories: Behavioral Scientists' Reflections
on The People of the State of California v. Orenthal James Simpson, 67 U. Colo. L.
Rev. 957 (1996) (applying storytelling principles to O.J. Simpson trial).
142 Vidmar & Schuller, Juries and Expert Evidence, supra note 8, at 148-71.
- Id. at 172.
I" Id. at 166, 172.
1
45 Id. at 173.
"4 Id. at 174.
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of a larger story; the expert may provide a story plot for the jury
to make sense of the evidence it has heard; or, the expert can
provide a story plot that helps explain the testimony of a par-
ticular witness." 7 The cases discussed in this Article included all
four types of expert storytelling.
Most evident, at least in the death penalty context, is that
where the expert tries to tell a key part of the story alone, relying
on deference to her expertise to make the story persuasive, ju-
ries are unlikely to be moved."4 The professional expert witness
generally was seen as an unreliable storyteller, one likely to spin
a tale for her own gain rather than for the enlightenment of the
jury. And, with only their own experience and beliefs through
which to judge the story's veracity, jurors tended to discredit de-
fense experts' testimony as being at odds with their worldview.
The lay expert, in contrast, was far more likely to be perceived
as a storyteller without a hidden agenda and, consequently, ju-
ries were far more receptive to the story she had to tell.
Juries became more interested in the professional experts'
stories when their testimony shifted into the other types of sto-
rytelling. Indeed, keeping with the storytelling motif, it may be
helpful to think of the expert as most effective when acting pri-
marily as a narrator providing a plot line within which to under-
stand the story's twists and turns. "9 This type of expert testi-
,41 Richard Lempert, Experts, Stories, and Information, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1169,
1175-78 (1993).
148 This fact may be less true in a case such as the one Lempert uses to illustrate the
category: a DNA expert called by the prosecutor in a rape case. Id. at 1175. In such
a case, the underlying evidence-the DNA test-may be seen as less susceptible to
manipulation by an expert, especially one presented by the prosecution. Among the
most favorably received experts in the study, for instance, were prosecution experts
testifying to matters such as DNA tests and pathology reports. See supra note 50.
1,9 See generally Taslitz, supra note 6, at 94-98 (discussing importance of "narrative
fidelity" in jury's evaluation of alternative stories). The lawyers in a capital trial, of
course, also must play the role of narrator and artist. See Doyle, supra note 118, at
417-34 (discussing capital defense lawyer's role as "artist" who must create a
compelling "representation" of the defendant for the sentencer); Michael E. Tigar,
Voices Heard in Jury Argument: Litigation and the Law School Curriculum, 9 Rev.
Litig. 177, 192-93 (1990) (discussing how listening to the "voices heard in jury argu-
ment" is critical for lawyers presenting their case to the jury). For an interesting
perspective on the need for capital defense attorneys to tell narratives not only to
juries and judges but also to a larger societal audience, see Austin Sarat, Narrative
Strategy and Death Penalty Advocacy, 31 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 353,373-81 (1996).
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mony was significantly more effective because the jury now had
a means of judging the expert's narrative apart from the expert's
status as storyteller. The jurors could look to what they had heard
from the other storytellers (lay experts and family members) in
whom they had far greater confidence, and see whether the ex-
pert's story plot made sense. If the narrative did harmonize with
the other testimony and evidence, then the narrative itself be-
came reinforced by the other stories that the jury had heard."
One case in particular illustrates how juries take an expert's
narrative and test whether it fits with the other stories they have
heard. The jury had heard extensive, heart-wrenching stories
from family members about the defendant's terribly abusive fa-
ther, vivid testimony about how the defendant had been unlaw-
fully incarcerated as a juvenile for a minor offense, and persua-
sive evidence from several other lay experts on how the defend-
ant adapted well to prison. It was against this testimonial back-
ground that the defense psychiatrist explained the effects of
child abuse to the jury, an explanation the jury found more per-
suasive than the prosecution expert's opinion because the de-
fense expert's narrative made more sense:
Juror: [Dr. A, who] was a child abuse expert and then some,
[said] that [this is] one of the worst cases of child abuse and ne-
glect she had ever seen and he never had a chance.... She was
really, like I said, she helped us so much... understanding
what caused him to do what he did and [the effects of the] child
abuse.
Interviewer: Did the [prosecution] psychiatrist try to suggest
that he did have control? That [the child abuse] wouldn't have
affected him?
Juror: Yes.
Interviewer: And why did you find [Dr. A's] testimony more
influential than [the prosecution's experts]?
'"The study, therefore, would appear to validate Lempert's prediction that when
an expert fills in gaps of a larger story, her credibility is enhanced because "a story
based largely on other case facts lends credence to an expert's claims." Lempert,
supra note 147, at 1176. Similarly, where the expert is providing an alternative story
about the evidence or a particular witness (for example, an eyewitness expert placing
an identification into context), Lempert argues that "[i]f juries evaluate both cases
and witnesses by story fitting, then every expert witness will want to embed her
conclusion in a story that plausibly explains it." Id. at 1178.
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Juror: Because we had all the other witnesses plus her. (F37L6).'
The defense expert's credibility as a storyteller, already height-
ened because her story fit best with the other evidence, was fur-
ther enhanced because, as several jurors noted, she often testified
for the prosecution and was an advocate of the death penalty. As
a result, they placed even greater confidence in her narrative be-
cause they knew it was one that she did not often tell.'52
Because the child abuse expert's narrative was found credible,
the jury then used it to help place the other witnesses' testimony
into a broader context of understanding. Her testimony filled in
any "gaps" as to the likelihood that the abuse the jury had heard
about from family and lay experts would have affected the de-
fendant.53 She explained that the defendant's abuse was one of
1 The prosecution psychiatrist apparently did acknowledge that child abuse victims
commit a greater proportion of crimes than those without a history of abuse. A dif-
ferent juror, when asked if any of the prosecution's testimony backfired, replied:
I think the [prosecution's] doctor, the child abuse expert, sort of almost laid
some ground work out. You know.., the prosecution was saying not every-
body abused commits murder, which is true you know, but there is a higher
degree of... people who do commit crimes or murder are child abuse victims.
So I, I think it sort of laid a little ground work for the defense, because that was
basically their case. (M40L 6).
15 This fact was recounted in several of the juror interviews: "One of [the child
abuse experts] incidentally, who was working for the defense, co-authored an article
in a book with the D.A., which his defense used very well. [It] was an article on child
abuse, the impact child abuse has.., on adults." (ML 6). In making a similar obser-
vation, another juror pointed to the expert's importance:
Juror: "There was one particular [psychiatrist] that was always for the death
penalty, except for this one case.
Interviewer: Oh, really? That's pretty convincing, I'm sure.
Juror: Yeah, it was. In fact, that was the one person's testimony that broke
our vote 'cause we were really locked between the death penalty and life with-
out parole. (M L6).
Defense counsel pursued a similar strategy in the Susan Smith case, having the
defense psychiatrist testify on direct how he had also been an expert witness for the
prosecution in prior cases. The expert further bolstered his credibility by stressing
the limits of psychiatric expertise and explaining that he had testified before
Congress about the need to ensure that experts do not exceed the proper scope of
their expertise in testimony. State v. Smith, Nos. 94-GS-44-906 and 94-GS-44-907,
1995 WL 578226, record at *24-*26 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. July 21, 1995) (testimony of
Dr. Seymour Halleck).
"1 See generally David McCord, Expert Psychological Testimony About Child Com-
plainants in Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: A Foray into the Admissibility of Novel
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the worst cases she had ever seen-sufficiently severe that it led
her to abandon her usual advocacy of the death penalty." As
one juror stated, "The psychologists were able to give us the
best indicator of [his] thought processes.... [R]ationales for
some of his behaviors." (ML 6). And, in the end, when the jury
was deadlocked with two holdouts for the death penalty, the
jury asked to rehear the testimony of the child abuse expert.
When asked what changed the holdouts' minds, a juror replied:
Juror: The actual listening to the tape of the doctor, the one
that was really insistent on the death penalty except for this
case because of the two factors-because of both the child
abuse and the imprisonment together. It was just like the kid
never had a chance, would not even had a chance to expand his
capabilities.
Interviewer: So listening to the tape of the psychiatrist really
changed [the holdout's] mind?
Juror: It changed his mind and so he voted life without pa-
role and then [the other holdout] went along with him ....
(ML 6).
Without the child abuse expert's testimony to fill in the gaps
in the story and provide an overall convincing narrative, the jury
would have lacked the overall story line that proved essential to
their final decision: the understanding of how the defendant's
abuse and unlawful imprisonment as a juvenile could have played
a role in his development.'55
Thinking about expert testimony as a form of storytelling
highlights the fact that juries attach great importance to the sto-
ryteller's identity and whether the story she is telling is consis-
Psychological Evidence, 77 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1, 34 (1986) (noting that "[t]o
most people the topic of child sexual abuse is unfamiliar and mysterious").
This point stuck with the jurors:
This one doctor, this one psychiatrist that.., had written books on it, I guess,
and she said she was for the death penalty, but in this case she wasn't.... [This
was b]ecause of the severe child abuse [and] the fact that he was in prison as a
youth in an adult facility for stealing a bicycle, for seven years .... (ML).
"0 Another juror, in describing how the rehearing of the expert and nurse's testi-
mony persuaded the holdout, told how the testimony gave the other jurors an ability
to point to statements in the testimony and say, "See ... here is where [there is] again
another explanation for his behaviors." (M5 L6). This use of expert testimony in jury
deliberations as a way of persuading holdouts is similar to how jurors described the
use of testimony in the rape-murder case discussed in Section IV.B.
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tent with everything else they heard during the trial.156 At least
in capital cases, this Article's findings suggest that responsibly
presented expert testimony may be helpful to the jury in under-
standing the overall significance of the different stories they
have heard. But, as the jurors' often sarcastic comments made
clear, when the expert attempts to tell only her story, the jury is
unlikely to listen.
B. Lessons for Effective Assistance of Counsel in
Capital Cases
This Article began by noting the various factors that have led
to experts playing a pervasive role in capital litigation." As the
Project's findings were explored, though, it became evident that
among the different types of witnesses who testify at a capital
trial-professional experts, lay experts, and family members-
the jury is likely to be most skeptical of the professional expert's
testimony. It is fitting, therefore, to conclude by coming back
full circle and asking, given this Article's findings, what are the
legal and ethical implications for defense attorneys who rely so
-SIn fact, the type of expert testimony that is most effective in practice may bridge
the chasm between the two sides of the debate over the proper role of expert
testimony in the "soft sciences." See supra note 6. Professors Bonnie and Slobogin,
for instance, while supporting the admission of mental health expert testimony as
"informed speculation," also strongly advocate better data collection and training.
Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 6, at 496-522; cf. Christopher Slobogin, The "Ultimate
Issue" Issue, 7 Behav. Sci. & L. 259, 265 (1989) (cautioning that much opinion
testimony should be admitted only if subject to rigorous adversarial testing). These
reforms not only make good policy sense but, as the jurors' comments make clear, are
critical if a jury is to find the expert testimony credible.
On the other side of the debate, even the critics of such testimony acknowledge
that mental health experts are "acute observers of behavior and can therefore effici-
ently provide ... rich behavioral data." Morse, supra note 6, at 983. The critics, how-
ever, would limit the testimony by not allowing the experts to go a step further and
present "[d]iagnostic and other conclusory labels" for such behavior. Id. at 1068.
Whether or not one agrees with the legal argument in support of such limits,
avoiding diagnostic and conclusory labels constitutes sound guidance for the type of
expert testimony that juries are most likely to respond to favorably: testimony heavy
on facts and unencumbered by "textbook" terms and theories. Thus, the most per-
suasive expert testimony is likely to be a combination of the reform proposals made
by both sides: experienced professionals adept at gathering relevant stories and facts
and presenting them so that jurors can understand in a commonsense fashion how the
testimony they are hearing fits in with the other evidence they have heard.
117 See supra Section II.B.
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heavily upon professional experts as they prepare and present
their cases to the jury?"
A clear first lesson is that defense counsel must view the ob-
taining of an expert as merely a preliminary step in the investiga-
tion of the defendant's case. A defense strategy that revolves
solely or even primarily around professional expert testimony,
especially psychological or psychiatric testimony, is likely to meet
with failure.59 Indeed, experienced capital litigators often advise
that only lay testimony be presented at the penalty phase, in part
because it reduces the prosecution's ability to introduce dam-
aging rebuttal evidence."i At a minimum, the study's findings
suggest that if an expert is to be used, the expert's testimony
must be effectively integrated with persuasive lay testimony. To
invoke the symphony analogy one last time, the defense attor-
ney must actively assume the role of composer and seek to write
a full instrumental score using a complement of witnesses whose
testimony harmonizes into a coherent mitigation theme.
Such a role for defense counsel, however, requires extensive
investigative time and effort. Unlike professional experts, fam-
ily members and lay experts do not readily appear upon the fil-
ing of a motion. They are likely to be found only after extensive
IO'As Professor Bonnie has consistently noted since Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
(1978), the expanded role of experts in capital sentencing also has important ethical
implications for the mental health experts themselves. See Richard J. Bonnie, Fore-
word: Psychiatry and the Death Penalty: Emerging Problems in Virginia, 66 Va. L.
Rev. 167, 187-89 (1980); id. at 189 (noting that clinicians acting as experts in capital
cases must be "sensitive both to the significance of their role and the limits of their
knowledge"); Showalter & Bonnie, supra note 41, at 161 (noting that while the broad
role of "psychiatric input at the sentencing phase" creates an important role for experts,
"it also allows for the unfortunate venturing into a more speculative level of
opinion ... that may not reach a threshold of either clinical or legal significance").
'9This Section primarily focuses on the use of expert testimony at the penalty
phase of the capital trial. While jurors showed some skepticism towards experts used
at the guilt phase who testified on matters such as ballistics and DNA evidence, their
harshest criticisms generally were directed at penalty-phase experts testifying about
behavioral theories.
1,0See Geimer, supra note 42, at 291-92; id. at 291 (arguing that because expert
testimony "opens the door to damaging cross-examination and rebuttal," lay witnesses
and closing argument should be used instead of an expert except in unusual instances);
see also Logan, supra note 89, at 18-19 (cautioning against using only traditional




research into the defendant's background and after talking to a
number of individuals involved with the defendant.' Even
family members, who at first might appear to be readily avail-
able as witnesses, may prove to be reticent. The types of infor-
mation that the defense is trying to uncover-stories of drug
abuse, child abuse, incest, and the like-are often viewed as
"family secrets" that will be revealed, if at all, only once the at-
torneys have gained the family's trust. Sometimes the defendant
himself proves to be an obstacle. He may be reluctant to reveal
such information or to identify family and friends who could tes-
tify, because he wants to avoid involving his family or feels shame
over what has occurred." Consequently, the family and friend
witnesses whom the jurors recalled as the most effective, those
with powerful and memorable stories, usually will be found only
after extensive and repeated interviewing of a wide range of ac-
quaintances.
The witness type that jurors identified as the most effective
overall, the lay expert, is apt to prove the most elusive of all. At
least with the family members, the attorney has the family tree
to guide her search for witnesses and information. Discovering
lay experts, on the other hand, requires extensive sifting through
the defendant's background to uncover the teacher, the em-
ployer, the prison guard who can knowledgeably and persua-
sively testify about the defendant's background and character.
Thus, while the lay expert may be the most effective witness for
weaving together the different strands of the defense, finding
such a witness and fully exploring how she fits into the defense's
theme will be a time-consuming challenge.
Given the horror stories about defense attorneys who have
represented capital defendants-attorneys who did no investiga-
tion prior to the penalty phase, fell asleep during trial, aban-
16' Geimer, supra note 42, at 290 ("Investigation for the penalty trial must be com-
prehensive, requiring counsel to learn about the client's life from pre-birth to the
present.").
" Indeed, the fact pattern giving rise to the Supreme Court's decision on what con-
stitutes ineffective assistance of counsel, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984),
largely revolved around defense counsel's inaction brought on by a sense of "hope-
lessness" because the defendant was uncooperative. The defendant kept rejecting
counsel's advice by confessing to the crime, pleading guilty, and waiving a jury. Id. at
672.
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doned their clients before the jury, or represented their clients
while drunk'63-it may seem odd at first to sound a cautionary
note of concern that attorneys may be relying too heavily on ex-
pert witnesses in capital cases. But the study makes clear that
overreliance on expert testimony, even if mixed in with a scat-
tershot of testimony from family members, does not develop a
coherent mitigation story that is likely to succeed before a
jury."s Consequently, as sympathetic as one might be to the
time pressures of capital defense work and the cascade of mo-
tions that an attorney must file and respond to, effective capital
representation requires counsel to develop the case beyond
simply traveling the statutory avenue of obtaining experts and
relying upon their findings as the mitigation case."'
It would be particularly disturbing if Ake's right to an expert"
became a de facto rubber stamp for courts to affirm death pen-
alties by finding effective assistance of counsel simply because
expert testimony was presented at the trial. Some courts have
shown a shocking reluctance to find ineffective assistance even
- Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst
Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 Yale L.J. 1835, 1841-49 (1994) (reviewing par-
ticularly egregious attorney malfeasance in capital cases); William S. Geimer, A
Decade of Strickland's Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical Undermining of the Right
to Counsel, 4 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 91, 150-61 (1995) (citing examples of lawyers
ineffectively assisting capital defendants).
'" Certainly, given that presenting mitigating evidence through lay witnesses is
generally more desirable, the fact that an expert's confidential report contains aggra-
vating information, as well as mitigating, does not justify defense counsel's presen-
tation of no mitigating evidence at all. A recent Fourth Circuit opinion addressing
such a fact pattern is therefore troubling. In Stout v. Netherland, Nos. 95-4008 and
95-007, 1996 WL 496601, at *1 (4th Cir. Sept. 3, 1996) (per curiam), the district court
had granted federal habeas relief because defense counsel had presented "'virtually
no case in mitigation.' despite the availability of "'overwhelming' mitigating evidence.
Id. at *9 (quoting unpublished district court opinion). The district court "discredited"
defense counsel's claim that he had not presented mitigating evidence because the
psychiatrist's report included an assessment that the defendant had an anti-social
personality disorder. Id. at *6. The district court pointed out that the evidence could
have been provided by family members rather than through the psychiatrist. Id. The
Fourth Circuit reversed the district court using a "very deferential standard" towards
defense counsel's strategic decisions. Id. at *11.
65See James J. Clark & Edward C. Monahan, The Mental Health Expert: Eight
Steps to Integrating a Specialist Into Your Case, Crim. Just., Spring 1996, at 2
(stressing need for lawyers to manage expert witnesses and effectively integrate their
use with other witnesses and evidence).
I6 See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
1188 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 83:1109
where there is no pretense of lawyerly skill: In one recent case, a
court made the incredible suggestion that a lawyer allowing his
co-counsel to remain asleep at the counsel table may have been
"a strategic move" to win sympathy from the jury." If a law-
yer's nodding off can be seen as effective trial strategy, think
how much easier it is for a court to give a quick nod of approval
to a lawyer's representation where that lawyer at least presented
some type of expert testimony. It would be a tragic irony if Ake,
a case making a significant step forward in giving defendants the
resources to defend against the death penalty, became just a ve-
neer to affirm death penalties because the courts and defense
counsel did not understand that experts are only one of many
tools necessary to build an effective case in mitigation.
167 McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 505 n.20 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The
sleeping lawyer candidly admitted at the motion for a new trial that, "I'm 72 years
old. I customarily take a short nap in the afternoon." Id. at 505 n.19.
